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INTRODUCTION
“Who sues the Supreme Court?” The short answer to the question of who sues
the Supreme Court of the United States is that pro se litigants (PSLs) do. A search
of federal case law (published and unpublished) reveals a wide range of subjects
giving rise to these suits. While it may be hard to conceive of why anyone would sue
the Supreme Court as a whole, the Justices as individuals, or the Clerk of Court,
there are many PSLs who—out of anger and frustration—feel that they must. They
are dissatisfied with the adverse outcome of suits they have brought or defended
against in the lower courts, and the Court’s subsequent refusal to review their cases
by denying their certiorari petitions.
The Supreme Court is not exempt from the reality of increased pro se
litigation experienced by state and federal courts at all levels since the late 1990s.
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s experience with PSLs, not only as
plaintiffs who sue them, but also as petitioners for the writ of certiorari to review a
lower court’s decision. Part I begins with a history of nineteenth-century pro se
litigation in the Supreme Court. The PSLs in these cases came from all walks of life,
and their claims arose from legitimate disputes.
Part II examines the sparse data on pro se filings in the Supreme Court.
Using in forma pauperis (IFP) filings as a proxy, this Part estimates the number of
PSLs seeking writs of certiorari to review earlier decisions resulting in outcomes
adverse to them.
Part III discusses the Court’s current view of PSLs. The Court’s view, once
quite sympathetic, has drastically changed. The change—to one that declares PSLs
are not entitled to assistance or instruction by the trial judge—may have been
prompted by the circus-like proceedings in the 1969 “Chicago Seven” case, where
the trial court bound and gagged defendant Bobby Seale due to his insistence that
he be allowed to represent himself. More recently, the Court has given trial judges
mixed messages about the extent to which they may provide PSLs with instruction,
accommodations, or assistance.
Part IV presents summaries of litigation against the Supreme Court as a
whole, the Justices as individuals, and the Clerk of Court. The cases are categorized
as either procedural or substantive claims. Procedural claims involve challenges to
denial of certiorari petitions, challenges to the constitutionality of the Court’s rules,
and challenges to the Court’s refusal to appoint counsel. Substantive claims include
those accusing the Court of violating civil rights and other laws, those seeking
rulings on the legality of wars, those complaining that the Court failed to do justice
in their case, and those requesting the Court to strike down public policies or
overrule its prior decisions. Pro se attorneys’ suits against the Court are also
described. This Part concludes with an enumeration of grounds for dismissal of
these claims. Part V then describes the Court’s experience with vexatious PSLs and
the manner in which it has addressed this phenomenon.
Lastly, Part VI describes the means by which federal courts manage pro se
litigation, followed by a description of the extent to which the Supreme Court
provides pro se assistance. The Article then provides a proposal aimed at reducing
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the number of certiorari petitions the Court receives and reducing the number of
suits brought against the Court. It suggests that the Court should employ pro se
law clerks—as done by district and circuit courts—to communicate directly with
PSLs, to give them information and a voice, and to enhance their feeling that they
were fairly treated. The Court could also accomplish reductions in certiorari
petitions and suits against it by amending its jurisdictional rules to accept factbased cases involving miscarriages of justice, and by accepting more cases that
delineate the extent to which lower court judges should provide PSLs with
reasonable assistance.
I.

EARLY PRO SE CASES

The Supreme Court heard fifteen pro se cases in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, but none before that. These cases—described in chronological
order—make for entertaining reading and reflect a wide range of subject matter.
Some of these cases are unremarkable, while others are quite interesting. The most
striking thing about them: none are frivolous. They all involve legitimate claims
raised by PSLs who, as plaintiffs or defendants, faced represented parties or even
another PSL.
The first pro se case was Wylie v. Coxe.1 In this case, a pro se attorney
obtained a judgment against the administrator of a decedent’s estate, for whom he
had recovered “a large sum of money which was due to [the intestate] from the
Mexican government.”2 The case arose as a consequence of Mexican-American War.3
The administrator appealed the $3,750 judgment against the estate, but then filed a
second appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.4 The
Court held the respondent’s second appeal should be dismissed because the first
appeal was then pending.5
The second pro se case heard in the Supreme Court, Purcell v. Miner,6
involved a property dispute between three parties: a purchaser claiming title to
property, the seller of the property, and a subsequent purchaser who was the PSL.
Noteworthy are the Court’s remarks about the disadvantages facing PSLs, which
were surprisingly compassionate:
Mrs. Miner did not answer, but made default. A good deal of testimony
was taken, many of the interrogatories—the parties managing their
own case—being of a most leading character. . . . The case appears to
have been carried on by the parties propriâ personâ, who are excusable
1
2
3

4
5
6

55 U.S. 1 (1852).
Id. at 2.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (ending the Mexican-American War and
settling territorial disputes, among other issues). The case returned to the Supreme Court in Wylie v. Coxe,
56 U.S. 415 (1853), in which the pro se attorney’s claim for his fees from the estate was affirmed on the
merits, id. at 419–20.
55 U.S. at 2.
Id. at 3.
71 U.S. 513 (1866).
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for their ignorance of all the rules of pleading and practice in a court
of chancery, or the proper mode of taking testimony.7
In Effinger v. Kenney,8 the appellant PSL purchased a farm in Virginia
during the Civil War and agreed to pay the sale price in Confederate notes. At the
war’s conclusion, the seller (trustee) refused the notes, demanding U.S. currency.
On appeal, the Court held that the PSL was required to make his payments with
U.S. currency, but in an amount equivalent to the value of the Confederate notes.9
Another pro se attorney brought an appeal in Porter v. White,10 also for
unpaid fees based on damages he collected from the Mexican government on behalf
of descendants of persons killed by Mexican agents during the Mexican-American
war. This appeal was dismissed; the Court found that several lawyers and law firms
were involved in the recovery of damages, and that the pro se attorney was not
entitled to the claimed fees.11
The case of Chappell v. Bradshaw12 was an appeal from a state court
judgment that found the petitioner PSL liable for trespass. His servants had
released a burning scow (a flat-bottomed boat used to carry heavy items), which
then caused damage to the respondent’s schooner. Here too, the Court dismissed the
appeal on grounds that no federal question was presented.13
United States ex rel. Lisle v. Lynch14 was an appeal by a Navy veteran PSL
who sought to compel the government to pay him $288.60 in travel expenses he
allegedly was owed for travel to his next assignment. The Court, however, rejected
his claim by holding that the officials who decided what his reimbursement would
be had acted in their discretionary authority, so that mandamus would not lie.15
Another pro se attorney in Green v. Elbert16 appealed to the Court from the
dismissal of an action he had brought against the Colorado Supreme Court. He had
alleged that its members had conspired to have him disbarred. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the lawyer failed to pay the required docketing fee for twenty
months after sending in his petition and the lower court record. The Court
dismissed his appeal, adding the following interesting comment:
We regret that we find ourselves compelled to add something
further. The printed argument of plaintiff in error contains many
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 516, 518 (emphasis added).
115 U.S. 566 (1885).
Id. at 567–68. Curiously, on the same day this case was decided the Court entered another order in the
companion case of Effinger. Kenney v. Effinger, 115 U.S. 577 (1885). The Court ruled that the appeal of the
trustee raised no federal question, and whether the bond of Effinger was or was not executed with reference
to Confederate notes was a question of fact for the state court, “and not one of law for this court.” Id.
127 U.S. 235 (1888).
Id. at 245.
128 U.S. 132, 133 (1888).
Id. at 134.
137 U.S. 280 (1890).
Id. at 286–87.
137 U.S. 615, 616 (1891).
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allegations wholly aside from the charges made in his complaint, and
bearing reproachfully upon the moral character of individuals, which
are clearly impertinent and scandalous, and unfit to be submitted to
the court. It is our duty to keep our records clean and free from
scandal. The brief of the plaintiff in error will be stricken from the
files, and the writ of error dismissed, and it is so ordered.17
In Hudson v. Parker,18 U.S. Judge Isaac C. Parker—the infamous “hanging
judge of Indian Territory”19—was himself a PSL. He had refused to follow the order
of Justice Edward D White, who had granted bail to a prisoner convicted of murder
in Parker’s court. Justice David Brewer, however, was the Justice assigned to the
Eight Circuit, wherein the conviction occurred; due to his unavailability, Justice
White had granted the prisoner’s request for bail pending appeal. On remand from
bail order, Judge Parker denied the prisoner bail on grounds that Justice White had
no authority to enter the order. This prompted the prisoner to file a mandamus
petition against Judge Parker.20 The Court rejected Judge Parker’s objection to
granting the prisoner bond, as he was ordered to do, stating:
As the district judge, in so refusing to approve the bond, appears to
have acted under a misunderstanding of the powers of this court and
of its justices, and of his own duty in the premises, and as in his return
he expresses his readiness to enforce any decision of this court, it
appears to us to be more just to him, as well as more consistent with
the maintenance of the rightful authority of this court, to sustain this
petition, and enable bail to be taken before him in accordance with the
order heretofore made, than to dismiss these proceedings, and to deal
with the matter over his head, as it were, by having the petitioner
admitted to bail by this court, or by the justice thereof assigned to the
Eighth circuit.21
One of several “Indian” cases was Addington v. United States,22 in which the
PSL was a member of the Choctaw Nation. He appealed his murder conviction for
the slaying of “a white person, and not an Indian, nor a citizen of the Indian
Territory, nor a citizen of any Indian nation or tribe.”23 This appeal was a challenge
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

Id. at 624.
156 U.S. 277 (1895)
Judge Isaac Parker presided over the dangerous Indian Territory from his court in the Western District of
Arkansas (Fort Smith) and came to be known by this moniker due his harsh sentences, particularly in
capital cases. “In 21 years on the bench, Judge Parker tried 13,490 cases, 344 of which were capital crimes.
9,454 cases resulted in guilty pleas or convictions. Over the years, Judge Parker sentenced 160 men to
death by hanging, though only 79 of them were actually hanged. The rest died in jail, appealed or were
pardoned.” Kathy Weiser, Isaac Parker – Hanging Judge of Indian Territory, LEGENDSOFAMERICA.COM,
https://www.legendsofamerica.com/ar-isaacparker/ (last updated Oct. 2019).
156 U.S. at 288.
Id. at 289.
165 U.S. 184, 185 (1897).
Id. He was sentenced “to suffer death by hanging.” Id.
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to jury instructions that distinguished between murder and manslaughter, and that
defined self-defense.24 The Court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the
instructions given.25
In Price v. United States,26 the Court considered an appeal from an obscenity
conviction by a PSL who had been found guilty of “depositing in the mails of the
United States obscene, lewd, and lascivious matter.”27 He argued for reversal on
grounds that there was no allegation in the indictment that he knew that the book
he deposited in the mail was obscene or lewd and lascivious, and that the
allegations are nothing more than a mere expression of the opinion of prosecutor
that the material was so obscene as to be unfit for repetition in the indictment.28
The Court rejected both arguments, affirmed the conviction, and addressed his
claim that there was no allegation reflecting the nature of the obscenity involved as
follows:
No one denies that there are degrees of obscenity, any more than that
two and two make four; but, when a book is stated to be so obscene
that it would be offensive if set forth in full in an indictment, such
allegation imports a sufficient degree of obscenity to render the
production nonmailable and obscene under the statute.29
One of the more interesting cases the Court heard in the late nineteenth
century is Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v. United States,30 an appeal by a pro se Alaskan
“Indian” from a denial of a habeas corpus petition brought to challenge his murder
conviction and sentence of death by hanging. In 1894, word spread to Fort Wrangel
of a murder in a nearby town in the Alaska Territory. A team of agents headed by a
commissioner and deputy marshal investigated and were led to the body by a
woman who later testified as an eyewitness to the murder. The defendants were the
woman’s husband and another man. Yet a third man testified as an eyewitness, in
addition to the defendant’s wife. At trial, defense counsel posed questions to the
wife seeking an admission that she was no longer married to the defendant; instead,
that she was living with the second witness. The trial judge sustained all the
prosecution’s objections to these questions.31
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, now as a PSL bringing his
habeas petition, that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections:
We think answers to all these questions should have been permitted.
The questions were directed to the purpose of showing material facts
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 188.
165 U.S. 311 (1897).
Id.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 314–15.
167 U.S. 274 (1897).
Id. at 275–76.
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bearing upon the character and credibility of the witness, and the
counsel for the defendant ought to have been permitted to proceed
with his examination, and obtain answers from the witness to that
end. The two Indian witnesses (of whom the woman was one) did not
agree in regard to the details of the alleged murder, and there is
enough in the record to show that they were both of a low order of
intelligence, and that they testified without any very solemn
appreciation of their responsibilities as witnesses upon the trial of one
individual for the murder of another. The whole occurrence at the time
of the alleged murder is left in a good deal of confusion, and the
credence to be given to the testimony of the woman was of the highest
importance.32
The pro se respondent in United States v. Winston33 was a U.S. Attorney.
Winston was designated by the Attorney General to represent the United States in
a Ninth Circuit appeal. As of 1861, the Attorney General oversaw U.S. Attorneys,34
and ten years later they fell under the Department of Justice.35 District attorneys
until 1896 were paid fees for their services,36 but their role as attorney for their
“district” did not include representation in “circuit courts.”37 As the Winston Court
stated, “[n]o express provision was made for appearances in those courts by the
district attorneys of the several districts, and the control of cases in them comes
within the general jurisdiction of the Attorney General as head of the Department
of Justice.”38
When Winston submitted his claim for services rendered in that case between
1890 and 1893, the United States refused to pay him.39 The government reasoned
that compensation for these services was already included in his normal salary as a
U.S. District Attorney within the Department of Justice, and that a certain
certificate had not been filed by the Attorney General indicating the services were

32
33
34

35

36

37

38
39

Id. at 277.
United States v. Winston, 170 U.S. 522 (1898).
Historical Timeline of the U.S. Attorneys: Attorney General Oversees U.S. Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/timeline/history#event-556026 (last updated June 20, 2018).
Historical Timeline of the U.S. Attorneys: U.S. Attorneys Work Under Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/timeline/history#event-556031 (last updated June 20, 2018).
In 1896 “Congress transformed them into salaried officers in response to the Attorney General's concern
that the fee system encouraged the attorneys to bring vexatious law suits [sic].” Court Officers and Staff:
U.S. Attorneys, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/administration/court-officers-and-staff-u.s.attorneys (last visited May 19, 2020).
District courts exercised jurisdiction over admiralty cases and minor criminal cases and civil suits, and
circuit courts were trial courts with jurisdiction over most federal crimes, disputes between citizens of
different states, suits involving the government, and some appeals from the district courts. See The U.S.
Circuit Courts and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-circuitcourts-and-federal-judiciary (last visited May 19, 2020). The appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts
ended in 1891 with the creation of the U.S. circuit courts of appeals. Id.
170 U.S. at 528–29.
Id. at 522.
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actually rendered.40 The Court, based on its interpretation of the statutory
authority of district attorneys and attorneys general, held that by law Winston’s
appointment was actually one of “special counsel,” that his services were not part of
his district attorney duties, and that he was therefore entitled to his fees.41
Another U.S. District Attorney brought a pro se claim for legal services
rendered on behalf of the government in United States v. Johnson.42 Johnson, at the
request of the Secretary of War, brought a condemnation action to acquire land for a
fortification on Staten Island, New York. The Court reversed the judgment of the
district court in his favor:
We are of opinion that congress intended . . . to uproot the practice
under which, in the absence of any statute expressly authorizing it,
extra allowances or special compensation were made to public officers
for services which they were required to render in consideration only
of the fixed salary and emoluments established for them by law. Our
duty is to give effect to the legislation of congress, and not to defeat it
by an interpretation plainly inconsistent with the words used.43
A Civil War veteran was the PSL in Calhoun v. Violet.44 He had entered the
Oklahoma Territory in 1899 before others and claimed a homestead tract, believing
federal law gave him such preference. Several others disputed his claim, arguing
that he had entered the Territory before the official entry date to the prejudice of
other claimants. The U.S. Land Offices, the Secretary of the Interior, and the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma all ruled against the PSL veteran.45
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the PSL’s appeal, holding that the
statute relied upon
was intended only to give to honorably discharged soldiers and sailors
an equal right with others to acquire a homestead within the territory
described by the act, and the proviso was thus intended simply to
exclude any implication that they were, in consequence of the prior
provisions of the act, not entitled to avail themselves of its benefits.
The proviso, therefore, in no way operated in favor of honorably
discharged soldiers and sailors, to relieve them from the general
restriction, as to going into the territory, imposed upon all persons by
the subsequent provisions of the law.46
In sum, the Supreme Court’s early experience with PSLs covered a range of
profiles, none particularly marked as pests, kooks, or vexatious litigants. These
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 526–27.
173 U.S. 363 (1899).
Id. at 380.
173 U.S. 60 (1899).
Id. at 60–63.
Id. at 64.
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included buyers and sellers of property, owners of damaged property, veterans
seeking travel expense reimbursement, private attorneys complaining of wrongful
disbarment, both private attorneys and U.S. attorneys seeking unpaid legal fees,
“Indians” appealing criminal convictions, a claimant stripped of his homestead
claim, a defendant appealing an obscenity conviction, and even a federal district
court judge challenging a single Supreme Court Justice’s order. Whether these
PSLs were permitted to conduct oral argument in these cases is unknown.47 The
opinions do not provide this information. But the cases described show that PSLs’
claims were taken seriously, and in many instances were sustained. The next
section describes the Supreme Court’s more recent experience with PSLs.
II.

FREQUENCY OF PRO SE FILINGS

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) publishes statistics on the
business of the federal courts, including tables reflecting the frequency of pro se
litigation in district and circuit courts—but does not do so for the Supreme Court.48
It is useful to know how much pro se litigation is part of the business of the lower
courts, as these are the litigants who may file suits against the Supreme Court if
they are unsuccessful at pretrial, trial, or on appeal.49

Figure 1: Percentage of Prisoner and Non-Prisoner Pro Se
Cases in US District Courts (2005-2018)
40
30
20
10
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Source: Table C-13, U.S. District Courts—Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, U.S.
COURTS (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables
(search by table number “C-13”; publication name “Judicial Business”).

47

48

49

Cf. SUP. CT. R. 28.8 (“Oral arguments may be presented only by members of the Bar of this Court. Attorneys
who are not members of the Bar of this Court may make a motion to argue pro hac vice under the provisions
of Rule 6.”). The quoted language was added by the Court in the 2013 amendments, “to clarify that
nonlawyers are not allowed to argue.” 23 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL §
528App.100, LEXIS (database updated Mar. 2020).
Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseloadstatistics-data-tables (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
The rate and extent of federal court litigation generally was recently found not to be increasing significantly
as had been suspected. See Mark D. Gough & Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates of Pro Se
Litigation in Federal Court, L. & SOC. INQUIRY: FIRSTVIEW (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2019.69.
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Figure 1 above presents the percentage of annual pro se filings in all federal
district courts during the 2005 to 2018 time period, the only years for which these
data were collected. Figure 1 shows a remarkably stable pattern in which the total
percentage of pro se filers ranged only from a low of 26% to a high of 30%, with an
average of 27%. Similarly, prisoner pro se filings ranged from a low of 17% of all
filings to a high of 22%, with an average of 19%. Likewise, non-prisoner filings
remained stable and ranged from a low of 8% to a high of 10%, with an average of
8%.50 Figure 1, however, shows that the frequency of non-prisoner pro se filings in
district courts is on the rise.
Appellate pro se filings in the Circuit Courts are shown below in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Percentage of Pro Se Filings
in US Circuit Courts (2005-2018)
60
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Source: Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables (search by table
number “B-9”; publication name “Judicial Business”; topic “U.S. Courts of Appeals”).

The appellate pro se filings show a gradual increase over time from a low of
42% to the 50–52% range between 2009 and 2018. They average 47% of the circuit
court filings over the twenty-two years of reported data. Unfortunately, the AO does
not distinguish between prisoner and non-prisoner PSLs in its published circuit
court statistics.
We know that the Supreme Court selects only a small number of certiorari
petitions for review each year.51 Determining the number of PSLs who have
50

51

Similar findings were made regarding the relative stability of pro se litigation in district courts by prisoners
and nonprisoners over the period 1999 through 2018 by Gough and Poppe, supra note 49, at 8–9 (“[W]e find
little evidence of a lasting pro se explosion.”).
Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educationalresources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“In fact, the
Court accepts 100-150 of the more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year.”).
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authored these petitions throughout its history is difficult, at best. As early as 1995,
the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts contained a footnote stating that
“[s]tatistics are limited with regard to pro se cases . . . Although the Supreme Court
does not separately track pro se or prisoner filings, 4,621 in forma pauperis (IFP)
petitions were disposed of in 1993, accounting for 69 percent of all case dispositions
that year.”52
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) publishes an Integrated Database online,
based on the data reported by federal courts to the AO.53 While the Integrated
Database includes extensive data on the business of the lower federal courts, it too
lacks any data on Supreme Court filings. The FJC does, however, publish some
charts and tables online regarding Supreme Court caseloads.54 They explain on
their website that case load data for the Supreme Court has been collected in fits
and starts.55 At no time has the Court reported the extent of its pro se litigation.
The closest proxy to such data (also used by the Judicial Conference in the
aforementioned Long Range Plan) is the report of IFP filings.56 These data, too,
were not always systematically collected:
Prior to 1945, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, and
other extraordinary relief that were accompanied by a motion for leave
to file in forma pauperis—that is, filed by indigent litigants who could
not afford to pay filing fees—were only placed on the Court's numbered
docket if the motion was granted. Beginning in the 1945 term, the
Court adopted the practice of numbering all motions for leave to file
that accompanied these petitions and placed them on a newly created
miscellaneous docket.57
52

53

54
55

56

57

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 63 n.14 (1995) [hereinafter
LONG RANGE PLAN], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf.
Integrated Database, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb. (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“The FJC
receives regular updates of the case-related data that are routinely reported by the courts to the AOUSC
[AO]. The FJC then post-processes the data, consistent with the policies of the Judicial Conference of the
United States governing access to these data, into a unified longitudinal database, the IDB [Integrated
Data Base].”).
Id.
“The best source of information on the Court's workload during this period is the Court's docket books,
available on microfilm at the National Archives.” Caseloads: History of Supreme Court Caseload Reporting,
FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-history-supreme-court-caseload-reporting (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020). Prior to 1887 no data was systematically collected. The Attorney General, and the
Solicitor General, published caseload data from 1880 to 1928, after which the data were published in the
Harvard Law Review until 1938. In 1932 the Journal of the Supreme Court began publishing case data. In
1940 the Director of the AO began publishing Supreme Court data. Id.
Winston Bowman, the very helpful Associate Historian for the FJC, advised me that if I use IFP data as a
proxy for PSLs “there may be some cause for caution depending on your definition of ‘pro se’. . . . [T]he
Court often appoints counsel for indigent parties under Rule 39 . . . [and] at least some of those litigants
also had appointed counsel in the courts of appeals.” Email to author from Winston Bowman (May 13, 2019,
8:08 AM) (on file with author).
Caseloads: History of supreme Court Caseload Reporting, supra note 55. The complexity of the matter is
further reflected by the following explanation:
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The AO does not collect data on the Supreme Court’s pro se filings. However,
the FJC published data from a variety of sources showing the number of IFP
movants whose petitions for certiorari were granted annually from 1970 to 2017,
reflected in Figure 3.

Figure 3: IFP Certiorari Petitions Granted,
by Year (1970 - 2017)
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Source: Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, Appeals and Petitions for
Certiorari, 1970-2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloadssupreme-court-united-states-appeals-and-petitions-certiorari-1970-2017.

This chart shows that the certiorari petitions granted by the Supreme Court
to IFP filers ranged from a high of thirty in 1970 to a low of five in 2016, with an
average of almost fourteen per year. The chart, however, reflects a steady decrease
in the number of certiorari petitions filed by IFP movants.
In order to determine the annual number of IFP filers of certiorari petitions
since 1967 (which I use as a proxy for pro se filers) one must extract these data for
each year from the Journal of the Supreme Court, these data not having been
previously compiled. The compilation is reflected in the Figure 4. The first thing one
notices about this chart is that pro se litigation in the Supreme Court started to
increase dramatically in the mid to late 1980s. It continued to increase through the
mid-1990s until 2005–06, when it began a continuing decline. These filings range
Beginning with the 1947 term, these petitions were included in the Court's calculation of total cases
on the docket. Note that statistics on the Court's caseload are presented by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts include the petitions on the miscellaneous dockets for the 1945 and 1946 terms.
When a motion for leave to file on the miscellaneous docket was accepted for plenary review, it was
transferred to the Court's appellate docket. (No transfer is made, however, if the motion for leave to
file is granted and the case is disposed of on the merits by the same order.) The statistics reported in
the Journal of the Supreme Court count these cases when docketed and transferred from the
miscellaneous docket and again when added to the appellate docket, in effect counting them twice.
In 1970, the Court abolished the miscellaneous docket and instead divided appellate cases into
original, paid, and pauper cases and ended the practice of transferring cases between dockets.
Id.
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from a low of 1,759 in 1974 to a high of 7,132 in 2006. In 2017, the Court received
4,595 IFP motions.

Figure 4: IFP Petitions Filed in Supreme Court (1970–2017)

Source: Journal, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (1970–2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/journal.aspx (collating annual filings in each volume’s “Statistics” section).

III. THE COURT’S MODERN VIEW OF PSLS
In 1866, the Supreme Court was sympathetic to PSLs. They were to be
“excusable for their ignorance of all the rules of pleading and practice in a court of
chancery, or the proper mode of taking testimony.”58 As a chronological review will
show, the Court has vacillated in its perception and treatment of PSLs and pro se
defendants, giving trial judges mixed signals about their obligations to them.
The Court in Coppedge v. U.S.,59 for example, held that judges should take a
“liberal view of papers” filed by pro se prisoners, which it found to be “equivalents of
notices of appeal” despite technical deficiencies.60 This “functional-equivalent
doctrine,” allowing non-compliant papers to satisfy the relevant notice-of-appeal
rule, was held in Coppedge and other subsequent decisions61 to properly invoke the
58
59
60
61

Purcell v. Miner, 71 U.S. 513, 518 (1866).
369 U.S. 438 (1962).
Id. at 444 n.5.
See Becker v. Montgomery, 582 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (holding that “imperfection in noticing an appeal
should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which
appellate court” where appellant filed a notice of appeal with a typed instead of a required original
signature); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 247 (1992) (holding that premature notice and appellate brief
filing within time for filing notice of appeal was sufficient); Fallen v. U.S., 378 U.S. 139 (1964) (holding
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appellate court’s jurisdiction because the papers reflected the inmate’s intent to
take an appeal from the judgment of the district court.62
In Haines v. Kerner, the Court held that a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint,
“however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”63 The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s
affirmance of a trial court order dismissing a prisoner’s civil rights complaint,
holding that he was “entitled to an opportunity to offer proof.”64
Faretta v. California65 is the landmark decision that recognized the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation in criminal cases. A trial judge had
imposed the public defender on the defendant, rejecting his demand to represent
himself. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
implies a right to self-representation:
In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers ever
doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right
might be considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel. To
the contrary, the colonists and the Framers, as well as their English
ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an "assistance"
for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself. The
Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that
necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is
supported by centuries of consistent history.66
In addition to the extensive historical and interpretive analysis, the Court—
consistent with its relatively compassionate past treatment of PSLs—placed great
weight on philosophical, autonomous grounds in justifying its recognition of the
right to self-representation:
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or
the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is
the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And
although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own

62

63
64

65
66

letter to sentencing court was sufficient), abrogated by Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416 (1996); Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (holding that one early notice, one late notice, and a post-trial motion collectively
were effective though technically deficient). State courts have followed the same approach, construing
certain documents as the functional equivalent of those required by court rules. See, e.g., Hughes v. Habitat
Apartments, 860 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1993) (construing an in forma pauperis affidavit as an answer).
Lower courts have recognized the distinction between pro se non-compliance with rules versus imperfect
compliance. Latitude has been given those litigants in cases of imperfect compliance with pleading rules,
U.S. v. $41,320 U.S. Currency, No. WDQ-12-1449, 2014 WL 6698426, at *3 n.18 (D. Md. Nov. 25, 2014).
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Id. at 520. Pro se “pleadings” now include “documents” generally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007).
422 U.S. 806 (1974).
Id. at 832.
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detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law."67
Of note is the obligation the Court placed on trial judges when defendants
state their desire for self-representation. Those who choose self-representation
“should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.’”68 And, so long as a defendant is “literate, competent, and
understanding,” his “his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an
assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”69
The foregoing language in Faretta does reflect a continuation of the Court’s
concern with how PSLs and pro se defendants are treated, and many lower courts
cite this language when addressing Sixth Amendment issues. Embedded in the
Court’s opinion, at note 46, however, is cautionary language, inserted because, as
the footnote begins, “[w]e are told that many criminal defendants representing
themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials.”70 In that
event, “the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who
deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct . . . . The right of selfrepresentation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”71
Faretta was decided only three years after United State v. Dellinger,72 a case
which most likely prompted the Court to empower judges to sternly handle
disruptive pro se defendants. At the same time, the Court made seemingly
contradictory rulings, holding, on the one hand, that a pro se defendant’s “technical
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 834 (citation omitted).
Id. at 835 (citation omitted).
Id. at 835–36
Id. at 834 n.46.
Id. (citation omitted).
472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). Dellinger, commonly known as the “Chicago Seven” case, resulted in a reversal
of convictions of defendants charged with coming to the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention to incite a
riot. The accompanying contempt citations imposed by the trial judge were also reversed. One of the
defendants was Bobby Seale, a Black Panther party activist:
Conflict over the defense attorneys reemerged when Bobby Seale refused to be represented by anyone
other than Charles Garry, who originally agreed to represent the defendants but remained in
California because of an illness. Judge Hoffman refused Seale’s subsequent request to represent
himself, and Seale responded with a barrage of courtroom denunciations of the judge as a “pig,” a
“fascist,” and a “racist.” When the prosecuting attorney accused Seale of encouraging Black Panthers
in the courtroom to defend him, the proceedings degenerated into worse shouting matches. Seale
condemned the judge for keeping a picture of the slave owner George Washington above the bench,
and Hoffman then followed through on his repeated warning to restrain Seale. In what provided for
many the indelible image of the trial, Judge Hoffman ordered U.S. marshals to bind and gag Seale
before his appearances in the courtroom. Hoffman allowed Seale in court without restraints the
following week, but when Seale argued for his right to cross-examine a witness, Judge Hoffman
sentenced him to four years in prison for contempt of court and declared a mistrial in the prosecution
of Seale. The Chicago Eight were now the Chicago Seven.
Bruce A. Ragsdale, Famous Federal Trials: U.S. v. Dellinger: The Chicago Seven Conspiracy Trial, FED.
JUD. CTR. (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/history/famous-federal-trials/us-v-dellinger-chicago-seven-conspiracytrial.
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legal knowledge” is not relevant to an assessment of his knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel, and, on the other hand, mandating that pro se
defendants comply with relevant procedural and substantive law. Thus began the
Court’s mixed messaging to judges about how pro se defendants (and, by
implication, PSLs) should be treated.
No further pro se-related decisions were handed down for nine years after
Faretta. Then the Court’s relatively accommodating perception and treatment of pro
se defendants took a turn in McKaskle v. Wiggins.73 In Wiggins, the Court upheld a
trial judge’s discretionary decision to appoint standby counsel to assist the pro se
defendant at trial over the defendant’s objection:
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when a trial
judge appoints standby counsel—even over the defendant's
objection—to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic
rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming
routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement
of his own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a
defendant through the basic procedures of trial is permissible even in
the unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's
appearance of control over his own defense.74
In so holding, the Court—citing language in Faretta’s footnote 46—made an
unfortunate comment:
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive
personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor
does the Constitution require judges to take over chores for a pro
se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as
a matter of course. Faretta recognized as much. “The right of selfrepresentation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.
Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law.”75
These two decisions (Faretta and Wiggins) not only cast pro se defendants
(and, by extension, PSLs) in a false light, portraying them as potentially disruptive
and non-compliant with rules of procedure and courtroom decorum. They also
reflect the Court’s recognition that pro se defendants may need assistance to
understand rules of procedure and substantive law, thus justifying appointment of
standby counsel. Yet, if no standby counsel is appointed, the defendant is on his
73
74
75

465 U.S. 168 (1984).
Id. at 184
Id. at 183–84 (1984) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Of course, Faretta did not
“recognize” that pro se defendants are entitled to no instruction from the trial judge. In fact, the Court
established the trial judge’s duty of warning the defendant about the risks of self-representation. And, the
fact that Faretta held that proceeding pro se is not a license to be disruptive, and that pro se defendants
need to comply with procedural rules, does not logically lead to the decision in Wiggins that they are
entitled to no instruction regarding courtroom procedure.
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own, with no entitlement to “personal instruction by the trial judge on courtroom
procedure.”
Further negative treatment of pro se defendants is reflected in Pliler v.
Ford,76 a habeas case:
District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro
se litigants. . . . Explaining the details of federal habeas procedure and
calculating statutes of limitations are tasks normally and properly
performed by trained counsel as a matter of course. Requiring district
courts to advise a pro se litigant in such a manner would undermine
district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers. And, to the extent
that respondent is concerned with a district court's potential to
mislead pro se habeas petitioners, the warnings respondent advocates
run the risk of being misleading themselves.77
While cautioning judges that they have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se defendants, the Court at the same time requires them to provide
notice and warnings to habeas petitioners if they decide to recharacterize a
prisoner’s motion as his or her first habeas petition:
[T]he court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigant's motion as the
litigant's first § 2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of
its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the
recharacterization will subject subsequent § 2255 motions to the law's
“second or successive” restrictions, and provides the litigant with an
opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing.78
The Court explained that:
the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand
not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also
(2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal.
The “lack of warning” prevents his making an informed judgment in
respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an
unwarned pro se litigant's failure to appeal a recharacterization
simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning.
Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a § 2255
motion for purposes of the “second or successive” provision, whether
the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.79

76

77

78
79

542 U.S. 225 (2004) (district courts are not required to give the particular advisements required by the
Ninth Circuit before dismissing a pro se petitioner's mixed habeas petition).
Id. at 231–32 (citations omitted); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (the Supreme
Court has “never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to
excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003).
Id. at 384. (emphasis added).
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The Court has also cautioned trial judges against interpreting the procedural
prescriptions in federal habeas case law that would “trap the unwary pro se
prisoner.”80
The Court in other civil cases appears to have returned to a somewhat
compassionate approach toward PSLs by requiring trial judges to provide them with
certain warnings and notices. For example, the Court has held that an overly
technical reading of Title VII would be “particularly inappropriate in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.”81
Then, in Erickson v. Pardus,82 reversing the Tenth Circuit’s departure from the
liberal-interpretation-of-pleadings rule established in Haines v. Kerner, the Court
stated: “The case cannot, however, be dismissed on the ground that petitioner's
allegations of harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.”83 In other
words, PSLs, despite inartful pleadings, are entitled to their day in court if their
pleadings raise plausible allegations.
Thus, we see that this Court has given trial and appellate courts mixed
messages about their obligations to PSLs. This has caused a lack of uniformity
among judges in their treatment of PSLs. As retired Seventh Circuit Judge Richard
Posner notes:
Depending on the type of case brought, the cooperativeness of the SRL
[self-represented litigant], the philosophy of the trial judge about pro
se litigation generally, and other factors make it such that some SRLs
receive notices, warnings, and accommodations, while others do not,
without a clear standard distinguishing who is entitled to them and
who is not.84
The Court has sown confusion among trial judges who are, on the one hand,
advised to construe PSLs’ papers liberally, provide them with certain warnings and
notices, etc.; and, on the other hand, are cautioned in the infamous language in
Wiggins that pro se defendants are not entitled to instruction by the trial judge
regarding court procedures.85 The lack of consistency in the Court’s rulings—not to
mention a desire to avoid any appearance of bias in favor of PSLs—makes it easy
for some judges and courts to decline to assist PSLs altogether.
80

81
82
83
84

85

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982)); cf. Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209–10 (2006) (holding that while a district court has discretion to dismiss a
habeas petition as untimely where the State has incorrectly conceded timeliness, nonetheless “a district
court is not required to doublecheck the State's math. If . . . ‘[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants’ then, by the same token, they surely have no obligation to assist
attorneys representing the State” (second alternation in original) (citations omitted)).
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).
551 U.S. 89 (2007).
Id. at 94–95.
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF
ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL ARGUMENTS 226 (2017).
See id. at 223 (“So, the Court, on the one hand, requires SRLs [self-represented litigants] to comply with the
same rules of procedure and evidence as represented parties. But, on the other hand, it declares that they
have no right to be informed of what those rules are.”).
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Judge Posner is the lone jurist to decry the view of most federal judges:
[F]or a judge (including a judge on an appellate panel) to assist a
litigant, even an unrepresented litigant in desperate need of guidance,
is to discriminate impermissibly against the litigant’s adversary. But
that belief ignores the imbalance in litigation between a party having
legal representation and a party unable, for lack of resources, to obtain
legal representation.86
Fortunately, in Turner v. Rogers, the Court recently recognized the potential
“asymmetry of representation” facing single parents in the context of a childsupport arrearage cases if prospective contemnors would be given a right to
counsel.87 The Court has provided no additional guidance to judges regarding PSL
management since Turner. Thus, the lack of consistency in the Court’s approach to
the question of whether—and if so, the extent to which—judges may assist PSLs is
still in flux. Consequently, trial judges each have their own policy regarding PSL
assistance, latitude toward imperfect rule compliance, or other accommodations.
The Court’s fickle approach to the question of PSL assistance by way of
instruction by the trial judge or otherwise has not only caused a lack of uniform
judiciary policy, it is a barrier to the adoption of its own programs and policies to
assist PSLs. This lack of uniformity has resulted in many disappointed and angry
PSLs who believe that justice was not done in their case. Research has shown that
PSLs feel that they cannot access courts because they are unable to obtain legal
representation, making them less likely to hold favorable views of the legal
system.88 Moreover, when judges fail to assist them in prosecuting or defending
their cases, PSLs perceive courts as having less legitimacy, and are less likely to
comply with the law.89
IV. SUITS AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT
A Westlaw search resulted in approximately 300 decisions (not all opinions)
involving suits against the Supreme Court, its individual justices, or the Clerk of
the Court. Other than those few brought by pro se lawyers, most were filed by pro
se non-lawyer. These cases can be grouped into those making procedural claims,
substantive claims, and those with unintelligible pleadings. Many of these cases
were filed primarily in district courts after the failure of the PSL’s underlying
litigation, which ended at the Supreme Court. Summaries of a sample of these cases
follow.
86
87

88

89

Id. at 270.
564 U.S. 431, 447 (2011) (declining to declare a due process right to counsel in civil child support contempt
cases; to do so would create “a degree of formality or delay” that would unduly slow payments to single
parents).
Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological
Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 473, 503 (2010) (“[W]hether people feel represented in the litigation
shapes their satisfaction, their willingness to accept the decisions made, and their evaluations of law and
legal authorities more generally.”).
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 89 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1990).
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A. Procedural Claims
i. Challenges to Denial of Certiorari
As expected, many of the cases involve a challenge to the Court’s decision to
deny certiorari. These cases include both civil plaintiffs90 and criminal defendants91
whose cases were refused review by the Court. These PSLs sometimes seek
injunctive relief and money damages against the Court for refusing to review their
appeals.92 For example, in Johnson v. Supreme Court of the United States,93 the
district court described the PSL’s mandamus claims as being that the Supreme
Court “(1) unfairly rejected all of his petitions for ‘not being totally correct and
perfect’; (2) unfairly rejected at least three of his petitions even after he filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis as instructed; and (3) only returned some
of his petitions, which ‘smell’ and ‘crumble’ in his hands.”94 The court dismissed the
case “because the justices of the Supreme Court have absolute immunity from suit
and because Yi fails to meet the standard for a writ of mandamus.”95
PSLs, by definition, do not always understand what the Court’s rules require,
nor do they have the capacity to comply with them. Thus, in Panko v. Rodak, the
Seventh Circuit described the PSL’s claim as involving the Court’s return of his
certiorari petition for failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 39(1) regarding
the printing of documents submitted to the Court.96 Parts of the appendixes to each
document had been reduced in size through photo-copying and failed to comply with
the print-size requirements.97 Other PSLs have complained that the Court or its
clerk refused to file a certiorari petition out of time,98 refused to file his petition
multiple times due to rule non-compliance,99 and claimed damages due of $50
million because “the defendant Clerk improperly rejected plaintiff’s petition.”100

90

91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

See Yi v. Supreme Court of the U.S., No. TDC-15-3731, 2016 WL 54804, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2016) (“[S]elfrepresented Plaintiff Chong Su Yi filed the above-captioned action against the Supreme Court of the United
States of America and each of its justices, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when the
Supreme Court denied Yi's petition for writ of certiorari in a separate case.”); Curry v. U.S. Supreme Court,
No. 1:16-cv-02733-JFA, 2017 WL 5951984, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2017); Hammer v. Supreme Court of the
U.S., No. 05 Civ. 4137(RJH), 2005 WL 1946038, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005).
Fels v. Supreme Court of the U.S., 586 F. App’x 230 (7th Cir. 2014).
Hafed v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 09 0327, 2009 WL 453122, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2009), aff’d, 352
Fed.Appx. 447 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (alleging wrongful denial of certiorari petition and seeking injunctive relief
and $1 in “punitive” damages).
No. Civ.A. 05-759-KAJ, 2006 WL 167555 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
606 F.2d 168, 169 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
Id.
Morris v. Supreme Court of the U.S., 559 U.S. 901 (2010) (mem).
Brown v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 08 2070, 2008 WL 5082141, at *1 (D. D.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
Humphrey v. Court Clerk ex rel. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 5:11-CV-938 (GLS/ATB), 2011 WL 7112904, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011).
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In Humphrey v. Court Clerk,101 the PSL acknowledged that he was required,
as a federal court litigant, to provide the Court’s Clerk with a current mailing
address for purposes of service and correspondence. He alleged, however, that the
Court’s Clerk, named as a defendant, refused to communicate with him by email,
and claimed that the defendants’ actions caused him to suffer severe mental
distress.102 And, in Hirsch v. Harris, the PSL complained that the Clerk of the
Court improperly “refused to acknowledge or transmit my Application to an
individual Justice,” which action he alleged violated his First Amendment right of
access to the courts and his Fifth Amendment right to due process.103 He sought a
writ of mandamus compelling the respondent to “transmit [the Rule 22 Application]
promptly to the Justice concerned,” and to “show positive proof of the
transmission.”104
ii. Challenges to the Constitutionality of Supreme Court Rules
Some PSLs are so offended by the Court Clerk’s refusal to file a petition for
rule non-compliance that they charge the rules themselves are unconstitutional.
Thus, in Kitley v. Supreme Court of United States,105 the PSL’s suit, arising from the
refusal of the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office to accept for filing an untimely petition
in which he sought rehearing of a denial of certiorari, sought (1) a declaration that
the applicable Rules of the Supreme Court are unconstitutional, (2) an injunction
prohibiting the enforcement of those rules, (3) a revision of the rules to conform to
the Constitution, and (4) the acceptance of his petition for rehearing.106
Wattleton v. U.S. Supreme Court,107 raised a similar claim. There, the PSL, a
federal prisoner, sought an order “declaring Supreme Court Rule 39.8, with respect
to case no. 12–7476, violates [plaintiff’s] right of access to the courts, right to due
process of law, and right to equal protection,” and requested the “enjoining [of] the
Supreme Court to deny the petition.”108
iii. Damage Claims for Court’s Refusal to Appoint Counsel
Civil PSLs often request appointment of counsel to pursue their claims.
Federal law provides that prepayment of filing fees may be waived by court order
for those proceeding in forma pauperis,109 but courts under the same statute also
have discretion in appropriate cases to “request” counsel to represent them.110 While
101
102

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

No. 5:05-CV-1159(NAM)(GJ), 2005 WL 2490155 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2005).
Id. at *1. The district court found that “plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts in support of his claim that
he is entitled to communicate with these federal courts by e-mail, nor has he demonstrated that he has
suffered any harm from the actions complained of.” Id. at *3.
Hirsch v. Harris, 1:15e4–cv–00488, 2015 WL 1540490, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2015).
Id.
899 F.2d 14 (Table), No. 89–3619, 1990 WL 39436, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 1990).
Id.
Wattleton v. U.S. Supreme Court, Civ.A. 13-9228, 2013 WL 654193, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2013).
Id. at *1.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (1996).
“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” Id. § 1915(e)(1).
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many PSLs request counsel, courts rarely exercise their discretion to request
representation for them.111 Courts take into consideration factors such as “the
complexity of the case, the ability of the plaintiff to investigate the case, and his
ability to present the case at trial.”112
State prisoner Jermaine Miller was upset at being denied counsel for his
various civil rights claims arising from appeals of his conviction, so he sued the
Supreme Court in the district court,113 alleging
that defendants [the Supreme Court Justices] have violated rights
protected under the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. He claims to have
sent subpoenas to six of the defendants to ask “[f]or their aid in [his]
legal defense to [his] innocence,” yet none of these defendants
“contacted [him] to confirm their stance with their summoning.” He
further alleges that he received “a Writ of Certiorari package” in
response to the “formal letter [he sent] to the U.S. Supreme Court . . .
[e]xplaining [his] legal situation in full detail,” instead of the
necessary “forms to commence [a] Civil Action against the six rogue
agencies” he had requested. Generally, he contends that “the seven
defendants are guilty of wrongdoing by not answering a subpoena”
and for relief from “the cruel injustive [sic] denials of government and
the mental anguish [he] endured.” 114
Miller’s prayer for relief was an “‘initial lump sum of 8 million dollars up front from
each of the defendant[s]’ and other relief.”115 Needless to say, his complaint was
dismissed.
Miller is not the only PSL who sought money damages against the Supreme
Court. There is also Marco Gallo-Rodriguez, who sued the Supreme Court of the
United States, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, and the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Florida
and the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that these courts had “refused to hear
plaintiff’s underlying constitutional claims that were brought to their attention

111

112

113

114
115

Lawyers cannot be mandated to represent an indigent civil litigant who is eligible for in forma pauperis
status. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). But see Sarah B.
Schnorrenberg, Mandating Justice: Naranjo v. Thompson as a Solution for Unequal Access to
Representation, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 260, 295 (2019) (citing Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793
(5th Cir. 2015)) (explaining that “if indigent parties cannot find a willing and able legal aid organization,
then they rarely have another accessible option for counsel”; summarizing the various tests used by
different Circuit Courts to request counsel’s representation of the indigent; and noting the court in Naranjo
is the first to compel representation for in forma pauperis litigants under the court’s inherent authority).
Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, Appointment of Counsel, in Civil Rights Action, Under Forma Pauperis
Provisions (28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 666 § 3[a] (1984).
Miller v. Supreme Court, 1:15–cv–00861, 2015 WL 3619072, at *1 (D.D.C. June 5, 2015) (alterations, except
last, in original) (citations omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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through a habeas corpus petition.”116 He also sought money damages, in the amount
of $500 million.117
B. Substantive Claims
i. Claims that Court Violated Civil Rights, Engaged in Conspiracy, and
Similar Claims
Aside from the aforementioned procedural claims, some PSLs make
substantive claims against the Court. For example, PSL Longinus Yen appealed
from a judgment of the Southern District of New York dismissing sua sponte his
complaint which alleged that former Chief Justice William Rehnquist violated his
civil rights.118 Specifically, Yen alleged that Justice Rehnquist had engaged in
antitrust conspiracies with two Supreme Court clerks, in order to ensure that the
appeal from his previously filed lawsuit, which was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, was not heard by the Supreme Court.119
PSL Benjamin Jones brought a similarly conspiratorial complaint against the
Supreme Court.120 The Second Circuit described his claim as follows:
Mr. Jones has not fared well in the past two decades. By his own
admission, he is impoverished, homeless, and mentally ill. He
attributes his plight to the success of a government conspiracy created
to destroy his mental, financial, and social well-being. He alleges that,
in the early 1970s, while he was confined to a mental institution in
California, federal agents implanted a microwave transmitter/receiver
into his body. This implant continuously transmits Mr. Jones’s
location to a global satellite surveillance system that, in turn,
monitors Mr. Jones’s activities. The implant can also receive and
amplify digital signals broadcast by the government at Mr. Jones;
these signals, once amplified, disturb his mental processes and can
inflict excruciating pain.
Mr. Jones, in this action, seeks damages for his torment. He
names as defendants virtually every judicial officer in the United
States government, save those associated with this circuit. Before the
district court, Mr. Jones petitioned for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. The district court denied his motion, and Mr. Jones appeals
that denial.121

116

117
118
119
120
121

Gallo-Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of the U.S., Civ. A. No. 08–1890, 2009 WL 3878073, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov.
19, 2009).
Id.
Yen v. Supreme Court of the U.S., No. 99-6198, 2000 WL 232664, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 2000).
Id.
Jones v. Supreme Court of the U.S., No. 94-4134, 1994 WL 582934, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1994).
Id.
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Not all PSLs with substantive claims seek money damages against the
Supreme Court. For example, Jaime Luevano filed a petition for writ of mandamus
to compel the United States Congress “to conduct an investigation and hold
hearings regarding the United States Supreme Court, the United States District
Court for the Districts of Columbia and the Texas unnamed federal judges, and
others in Washington D.C. and Texas,” and sought an investigation of various
unnamed judges and courts and others allegedly involved in a “grand, unspecified
conspiracy.”122 This was not Luevano’s first action against the Court. He had
previously filed an action against the Chief Justice for the conduct of the Court’s
clerks.123 In that case, he alleged that the Clerk and Deputy Clerks of the Supreme
Court had “failed to file his petition for a writ of certiorari, and that the Chief
Justice has failed to properly supervise these employees. For these alleged violations
of rights protected by the United States Constitution, plaintiff demand[ed] no
particular relief.”124
ii. Complaints Seeking Rulings on Legality of Wars
Some PSLs have a political agenda, such as those who seek an order of the
Supreme Court declaring a war to be illegal. Steve Perdue and other co-plaintiffs
brought such an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Vietnam War was
illegal.125
The named defendants were the Supreme Court of the United States
and the individuals who at that time were the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of that Court. The relief sought was that: 1. The
petition be accepted and that the defendants be ordered to establish a
hearing date for the issues presented. 2. That the Supreme Court of
the United States declare whether or not participation in the Viet
Nam War by the United States is legal or illegal.126
Perdue’s claim was dismissed by the district court, which called the
complaint “a sham.”127 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the
complaint failed to state a claim; the court lacked jurisdiction; no case or
controversy existed; and the plaintiffs lacked standing. Moreover, “[n]either the
district court nor this court has authority to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as defined by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 1251, and by the Constitution, Article III,

122

123

124
125
126
127

Luevano v. U.S. Supreme Court, CIV. No. 12–00200 SOM/KSC, 2012 WL 1491865, at *1 (D. Haw. Apr. 27,
2012).
Luevano v. U.S. Supreme Court Clerks, Civil Action No. 09 0071, 2009 WL 82189, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 13,
2009)
Id. (emphasis added).
Perdue v. Supreme Court of the U.S., 439 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
Id. at 807.
Id.
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§ 2, to include cases between private citizens and the Court or the Justices of the
Court.”128
iii. Claims the Court Failed to Do Justice
This category of cases against the Supreme Court involves PSLs who
complain of its failure to do justice to remedy adverse outcomes in previous suits
against third parties. For example, PSL Wesley Hotchkiss brought an action
against the Court alleging:
[S]ince 1991 numerous state and federal courts have done nothing to
assist him to obtain back pay and interest from his former employer;
that his retained attorney failed to represent him; and that the Oregon
and American Bar Associations, and numerous state and federal
agencies, failed to take any action.129
Richard Muzzi sued the Supreme Court due his dissatisfaction with the grant
of summary judgment against him in a prior suit130 against his former employer
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for disability discrimination
and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.131 His complaint alleged
that the Court violated his constitutional rights via the federal judicial process
when his prior case was dismissed on summary judgment. He complained that he
was harmed “by the unconstitutional laws passed by the United States Congress, by
the misinterpretation and the misapplication of the laws by the federal courts, and
by statements made by the judges presiding over his case.”132 He prayed for the
reinterpretation of the laws and the restructuring of the courts and judiciary
powers.133 He also prayed for the changing of the jurisdiction of each appeals
court.134 Lastly, he sought compensation of “at least $23.00.”135
Another PSL, Lawrence Harris, had brought suit contesting his unsuccessful
tryout for a basketball team—the Tulsa 66ers—which was dismissed by the
Northern District of Oklahoma for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with the

128
129

130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Hotchkiss v. Supreme Court of the U.S., No. 97-35059, 1997 WL 542305, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1997). In
addition to the defendants the Circuit Court noted, Hotchkiss also sued:
Janet Reno, sued as “Janice Reno,” Attorney General of the United States; Attorney General for the
State of Oregon; Foreman of Federal Grand Jury; the American Bar Association; Oregon Medical
Association; Saif Corporation; Oregon Department of Workmans Compensation; Department of
Finance Oregon, sued as “Oregon Department of Insurance and Finance”; Oregon Vocational and
Rehabilitation Division; Campus Drive in Cleaners Incorporated; Yergen & Meyer Corporation; John
Does, Defendants-Appellees.
Id.
See Muzzi v. U.S. Gov't, No. Civ.A.02-0297, 2002 WL 922378 (E.D. La. May 6, 2002).
Muzzi v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. Civ.A.02–2017, 2002 WL 31324140, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2002).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.at *3.
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Tenth Circuit affirming and certiorari ultimately denied.136 He then sued the
Supreme Court “to challenge the wisdom of the Justices’ decision” refusing to hear
his appeal.137 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed that
suit, holding that it “lacks any power to review the Supreme Court's actions.”138
And then there was Henry Astrop, a PSL who sued a pharmacy in Virginia
state court for failing to have his medications in stock; the trial court dismissed the
case on the defendants’ motion.139 He then took the same complaint to federal court
and saw it dismissed for failure to state a claim.140 Astrop appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.141 He petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari and was denied.142 At that point, Astrop decided to sue the Supreme
Court on the grounds that denying his certiorari petition infringed his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights because he “was legally blocked from further
pursuing the injuries [he] endured.”143 The Eastern District of Virginia dismissed
that complaint, because it “fail[ed] to allege any facts that amount to a plausible
claim against the Supreme Court of the United States.”144 Astrop appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.145 Mr. Astrop did not pursue another
petition for certiorari.
iv. Requests that Court Strike Down Public Policies or Prior Decisions
Occasionally, a PSL will sue the Supreme Court to request that it strike
down certain public policies or overrule its own decisions, such as when PSL James
Skelton filed suit against the Court asking it to overrule Roe v. Wade.146 The Roe
decision,147 he argued, “violates the right of unborn babies to ‘life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness,’ as well as being a violation of the ‘separation of powers by’ the
Court ‘legislating from the bench.’”148 He also requested that the Court “‘outlaw
abortion’ and ‘order all abortion clinics closed,’ as well as have a memorial built” for
the aborted fetuses.149

136

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

144
145
146
147
148
149

Harris v. PBC NBADL, LLC, No. 10–cv–00782, 2011 WL 719619 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 2011), aff'd, 444 F.
App’x 300 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1011 (2012).
Harris v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1577, 2012 WL 5240811, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2012).
Id. (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Astrop v. Rite Aid Distribs., No. CL08000133-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009).
Astrop v. Eckerd Corp., No. 3:09CV681, 2010 WL 1779992 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2010).
Astrop v. Eckerd Corp., 397 F. App'x 881 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Astrop v. Eckerd Corp., 562 U.S. 1152 (2010), reh’g denied, 562 U.S. 1266 (2011).
Astrop v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 3:11CV203, 2011 WL 9517440, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2011) (alteration
in original).
Id. at *2.
Astrop v. U.S. Supreme Court, 447 F. App’x 492 (4th Cir. 2011).
Skelton v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 3:09–1435–MBS, 2009 WL 2485983, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2009).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Skelton, 2009 WL 2485983, at *3.
Id.
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PSL Tyrone Hurt also brought an action in diversity requesting the Supreme
Court reverse its ruling in Roe v. Wade.150 He was a little more specific than
Skelton, however, by claiming that “abortion is violence against women and should
be abolished because it violates the 8th Amendment, human rights, and world
order.”151 He sought “one million dollars punitive and compensatory damages”
against the Court and its individual Justices.152 Likewise, PSL David Mantle
requested the District Court to order the Supreme Court to “fix the Roe v. Wade
law—so that all of us fathers who want to file a complaint later—to save the baby,
can file a complaint later to claim custody of the baby.” 153
In addition to challenges to Roe v. Wade, other actions against the Supreme
Court include those seeking to overrule the decision barring prayer in schools. One
example is a different action brought by the aforementioned PSL, James Skelton,
“to overturn the previous 1962 Supreme Court ruling that outlawed prayer in public
schools.”154 His complaint stated:
I James Skelton as a born again Christian and disabled American
veteran do hereby file this pro se law suit against the United States
Supreme Court in an effort to overturn the previous 1962 Supreme
Court ruling that outlawed prayer in public schools. By the previous
Supreme Court’s ruling against prayer and the posting of the ten
commandments in public schools they have in fact made God an
outlaw. As one nation under God the United States Supreme Court
has acted as an enemy of domestic terrorism and therefore bringing
the wrath of God on our schools, children and society. If prayer and
the posting of the ten commandments had been allowed the
possibilities of the mass shooting and violence would have never
happened. All right came from God including the right to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. We the people have the right to worship
150

151
152

153

154

Hurt v. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, Civil Action Nos. JFM–12–3643, –3644, –3646, –3647, 2012 WL
9189916, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012). He also sued “two former United States presidents.” Id.
Id.
Id. In one related and consolidated action, Hurt sued two United States District Court judges and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Northern District of California: “He states defendants are sitting
judges required to render decisions and opinions in accordance with the U.S. Constitution. As relief plaintiff
seeks an order requiring all judges in the twelve courts to interpret the U.S. Constitution and if unable to
do so, to implement Art. II, § 4 of the Constitution.” Id. In a second, consolidated action, he named the
United States of America and others as defendants.
He claim[ed] that former President Richard M. Nixon and former President George W. Bush should,
in the history of this nation, be considered dictators because they were responsible for creating three
unnecessary wars that were against the protocol document to the U.S. Constitution. (Viet Nam,
Afghanistan and Iraq). He further state[d] that both presidents disregarded and violated the U.S.
Constitution, but especially President Bush because he created two of the worst illegal and
unconstitutional wars without [the] consent of the American people.
Id.
Mantle v. U.S. Supreme Court, Civil Action No. 2:09–CV–633, 2009 WL 2579428, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17,
2009).
Skelton v. U.S. Supreme Court, C/A No. 3:13–465, 2013 WL 1768698, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2013).
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God in our own way without inference (sic) from the government. The
United States Supreme Court has not acted in the defense of freedom
of religion and its previous rulings on all Christian matters should be
struck down. This is the only humanitary (sic) thing to do if we are to
have a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.155
Skelton’s prayer for relief added an additional claim. He asked the Court to
“[s]trike down all previous United States Supreme Court rulings on prayer in public
schools. Also strike down any and all United States Supreme Court ruling [sic] on
the posting of the ten Commandments in public display.”156
In addition, PSL Jeffrey Gibson’s complaint “discusse[d] his own theories on
taxing and monetary policy in this country, and then [sought] wide-ranging relief,
including an order granting his motion ‘invoking U.S. constitutional marshal
status,’ as well as damages in the amount of ‘11 million United States dollars.’”157
Gibson named the Supreme Court’s Clerk of Court, as well as “all federal judges,” as
defendants.158 He was apparently well-known to the Court, the district court having
referred to him as “a prodigious, if prodigiously unsuccessful, pro se litigant in this
Court who has filed at least 28 prior cases in federal court over the years.”159 A
footnote in the case states, “It should be noted many of these cases have had only
fleeting and evanescent existences, having been promptly dismissed by the
courts.”160
iv. Pro se Attorneys’ Claims
The cases against the Supreme Court, its Clerk of Court, or individual
justices are not only filed by laymen. Pro se attorneys have also brought such cases.
For example, lawyer Michael Newdow was the lead plaintiff in a group “who
individually describe themselves as atheist, nonreligious and nontheistic,
Secularist, or humanist,” brought an action against multiple defendants.161 These
included Chief Justice Roberts, the Presidential Inaugural Committee, the Joint
Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, the Armed Forces Inaugural
Committee, and “‘Other Unknown Oath Administrators,’ ‘Other PIC Defendants,’
and ‘Other Unnamed Clergy’ whom the President or President-elect may ask in the
155
156

157
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160
161

Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at *2; cf. Morris v. U.S. Supreme Court, 286 F. App’x 24, 25 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (PSL requesting
the Court “to put the Bible back in all public schools in the U.S.A., and to impose sanctions”).
Gibson v. U.S. Supreme Court Clerk, Civil No. 1:10–CV–2348, 2010 WL 5088232, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16,
2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1 n.1.
Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1006–07 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (“The complaint
represented the third Establishment Clause lawsuit the lead plaintiff, Michael Newdow, has brought before
federal courts against religious elements of presidential inaugural ceremonies.”). Newdow was also the
plaintiff and pro se counsel in Elk Grove Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2004) (holding
plaintiff, a non-custodial parent of his child, lacked standing to bring an action in federal court challenging
the constitutionality of a school district policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance).
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future to conduct and facilitate religious oaths and prayers at the 2013 and 2017
inaugurations.” 162 The suit sought injunctive relief to prevent the inclusion of
prayers and phrases like “So help me God” in the presidential oath at the
inauguration ceremonies, alleging they would be “violations of the First and Fifth
Amendments, and in particular the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.”163 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case on mootness and standing
grounds, noting:
The President cannot be denied the prerogative of making such a
religious reference, [the plaintiffs] concede, because doing so would
abrogate his First Amendment rights. For sure, if it were otherwise,
George Washington could not have begun the tradition by appending
“So help me God” to his own oath; Lincoln could not have offered a
war-weary nation “malice toward none” and “charity for all [ ] with
firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right”; Kennedy could
not have told us “that here on earth God’s work” must be our own; nor
could President Reagan have evoked “the shining city . . . built on
rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and teeming
with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace” in his farewell
address.164
Another pro se attorney, Ezra Borntrager, “complain[ed] that the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United States illegally refused to accept and process his
application for admission to the Supreme Court Bar.”165 He had “refused on
religious grounds to provide his social security number in the space reserved for
that number on the bar application form.”166 The clerk “declined to process the
application, informing him that Rule 5.2 of the Supreme Court Rules required
applicants to complete ‘the form approved by the Court,’” but Borntrager contended
“that the clerk’s actions violated his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments
of the Constitution and under § 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974.”167 Borntrager sought
mandamus relief “commanding the clerk to process his application,” and sought
“$6.1 million in actual and punitive damages against the clerk in his individual and
official capacities.”168 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment
for the clerk.169
Lastly, pro se attorney Montgomery Sibley brought an action against the
Supreme Court in the district court, claiming “that the Supreme Court ‘putatively’
suspended him from the practice of law in that Court [before] ruling on a pending
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

603 F.3d at 1002, 1010.
Id. at 1006–07.
Id. at 1010 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Borntrager v. Stevas, 772 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420–21.
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petition he . . . filed in a previous case before that Court,” and that it “refus[ed] to
file a motion that he submitted after his suspension.”170 After being disbarred by
the Court, he “continued to file petitions and motions in several other matters”; he
also argued “that Justice Thomas’s failure to act on a particular motion for an
extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari wrongfully precluded [him]
from seeking review before the . . . Court in that case.”171
Plaintiff contends that the Justices “usurped jurisdiction” by “failing
to say what the law is” and denying him an impartial tribunal. He also
disputes the legality of the judicial immunity doctrine. These
arguments are unavailing. Plaintiff has sued the Supreme Court and
its Justices on several occasions and, like here, he has then faulted the
Justices for not ruling on his motions in a timely manner, denying
writs of certiorari, and failing to recuse themselves to provide an
impartial tribunal. Such arguments are “nonsense.”172
C. Unintelligible Pleadings
Some PSL pleadings are so unintelligible that they are routinely
dismissed.173 There are many examples of such cases generally and, in particular, in
cases against the Supreme Court. For example, in Rice v. U.S. Supreme Court,174
the district court quoted the PSL’s caption and claims, and found these pleadings175
to be “patently insubstantial” and dismissed the complaint: “Plaintiff has not stated
a coherent claim against any of the defendants. Plaintiff’s claims are so attenuated
and unsubstantial as to be devoid of merit.”176
Additional examples of complaints against the Supreme Court dismissed for
unintelligibility or frivolousness are where courts have found:
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Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court, 786 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). In addition to the
Supreme Court, Sibley named as defendants Justices of the Supreme Court, United States District Court
Judge Richard J. Leon, United States District Court Judge Henry H. Kennedy, Jr, Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Eric T. Washington, District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk Mark Langer, United
States Supreme Court Deputy Clerk Cynthia Rapp, the United States Marshals Service, and two unnamed
officers from the United States Marshals Service. Id. at 340. The opinion notes his claim against the
Marshals was “for escorting him to the District Court Clerk's office upon his arrival at the United States
Courthouse for the District of Columbia.” Id. at 341.
Id. at 341. Sibley had apparently been suspended from the practice of law in Florida for three years
previously, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had also suspended his license to practice for
three years. He claimed “that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals attorney disbarment rules and
practices violate[d] a number of his constitutional rights.” Id. at 340.
Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193
U.S. 561, 579 (1904)) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their
jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”).
No. C03–05582CRB, 2003 WL 22999539 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2003).
See infra Appendix.
Rice, 2003 WL 22999539, at *2.
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Plaintiff’s complaint [was] composed entirely of vague, conclusory,
disjointed and farfetched allegations. For example, in her complaint
plaintiff allege[d] that “President Reagan imposed military duties to
Vietnam w/o authorization to find MIAs of which his family involved,”
that “Mr. Clinton was given monies from New York Hospital” and that
“Shirely Hauter (S.J + Sac. P.D) discovered Jerry Brown, JFK, Jr.,
Caroline Kennedy, et al. selling drugs: sexual misconduct,
homosexuality, etc.”177
In Flores v. U.S. Supreme Court, the court stated:
Plaintiff, a homeless individual who submitted more than 30 mostly
cryptic complaints within the first two weeks of March alone, sue[d]
the United States Supreme Court and the United States Congress. He
state[d] that his “complaint is against the countries that practice
unfair trade practices . . . ,” and he sues the United States apparently
for failing “to react.”178
In Ciriello v. U.S. Supreme Court, the court noted that the complaint was frivolous
because
the United States Supreme Court and the President of the United
States, George Bush, [bore] no apparent connection to alleged
offenses committed against plaintiff by St. Mary’s Hospital or the
Waterbury Police Department, and there [was] no indication that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [had] violated plaintiff’s rights, the
only apparent connection to the federal government that may be
discerned from the complaint.179
Lastly, case captions themselves can also be evidence of frivolousness.180

177
178
179

180

Robertson v. U.S. Supreme Court, No. 2:13–cv–1628, 2013 WL 5520068, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013).
No. CIV.A. 13-692, 2013 WL 2107172, at *1 (D.D.C. May 13, 2013).
No. Civ. 3:02CV2131, 2002 WL 32254512, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2002); see also Ciriello v. U.S. Supreme
Court, No. Civ. 3:03CV485, 2003 WL 22472162 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2003).
Plaintiff’s complaint is found to be frivolous because defendant, the United States Supreme Court,
bears no apparent connection to a claim of insurance fraud allegedly perpetrated by Prudential
Insurance Company. Contrary to plaintiff’s understanding, the Supreme Court does not oversee the
conduct of state criminal proceedings, nor does it engage in factfinding on individual complaints. Its
involvement in the judicial process in no way subjects it to liability for any wrong alleged by plaintiff.
2003 WL 22472162, at *1.
See, e.g., Warrence v. Obama, 574 F. App’x 858, 858 (10th Cir. 2014). The caption of the complaint stated:
Nikos WARRENCE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Barack Hussein OBAMA II, United States President;
United States Justice Department, as an entity and all individual members directed police and
green-lighting Nazi book-burning, felony intimidation with the threat of violence and death, infinite
fascist actions on the part of any government official (Eric Holder listed separately in attached); U.S.
Supreme Court as an entity (members follows, all sent via USPS notification); John G. Roberts; Sonia
Sotomayor; Stephen Breyer; Samuel A. Alito; Elena Kagan; Clarence Thomas; Antonin Scalia;
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D. Grounds for Dismissal
Cases brought against the Supreme Court are dismissed on several grounds.
Most commonly, they are dismissed based on principles of judicial immunity. For
example, in Lyons v. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the court held:
In sum, plaintiffs appear to allege that defendants violated various
constitutional and statutory rights in their handling of various
lawsuits Mr. Lyons has filed relating to his discharge from civilian
employment with the Army; among other things, they appear to allege
that some of the defendants wrongfully and maliciously stated in their
judicial opinions that Mr. Lyons was discharged because his
performance was unsatisfactory . . . . As plaintiffs appear to
acknowledge several times in their complaint, defendant judges are
entitled to absolute immunity from liability for acts in the
performance of their judicial duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 359 (1978) (immunity applies even if judge's “exercise of authority
is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors”); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (immunity applies “even when the judge
is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Accordingly, this case
must be dismissed as to defendant-judges and justices.181
Failure to state a cause of action is another common ground for dismissal. In
Astrop v. U.S. Supreme Court, where the PSL complained of the Supreme Court’s
certiorari denial, the district court held that “none of Plaintiff's allegations
implicate the First or Fourteenth Amendments, and the complaint fails to allege
any facts that amount to a plausible claim against the Supreme Court of the United
States. The complaint thus fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.”182 Other
courts have dismissed suits against the Court on case-or-controversy and standing
grounds. For example, in Skelton v. U.S. Supreme Court, the PSL complained about
the Court’s earlier ruling prohibiting mandatory prayer in public schools by alleging
that:
By the previous Supreme Court's ruling against prayer and the
posting of the ten commandments in public schools they have in fact
made God an outlaw. As one nation under God the United States
Supreme Court has acted as an enemy of domestic terrorism and
therefore bringing the wrath of God on our schools, children and

181
182

Anthony Kennedy; Ruth Bader Ginsburg; Chief Tenth Circuit Court Of Appeals Judge Mary Briscoe;
and 81 Additional Nazi Bookburning Felons, Defendants–Appellees
Id. The district court had ruled that “[t]he Complaint is largely unintelligible; it is a verbose, disorganized,
and confusing diatribe. In short, the Complaint makes no sense.” Id. at 859. The Tenth Circuit held that
“Mr. Warrence's appeal fails to make any improvement on the rambling incoherent statements he made
below. He certainly fails to convince us of any error in the district court's disposition of this case.” Id.
CIV.A. No. 88-1193 (RCL), 1988 WL 138776, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1988).
No. 3:11CV203-HEH, 2011 WL 9517440, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2011), aff'd, 447 F. App'x 492 (4th Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
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society. If prayer and the posting of the ten commandments had been
allowed the possibilities of the mass shooting and violence would have
never happened. All right came from God including the right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We the people have the right to
worship God in our own way without inference [sic] from the
government. The United States Supreme Court has not acted in the
defense of freedom of religion and its previous rulings on all Christian
matters should be struck down. This is the only humanitary [sic] thing
to do if we are to have a government of the people, for the people, and
by the people.183
The court dismissed Skelton’s case by holding that he lacked standing to sue the
Supreme Court because “[p]laintiff makes no showing of a ‘personal stake’ or injury
‘particularized as to him’ caused by the Defendants in this lawsuit.” 184 Nor did he
have standing to sue on behalf of other individuals.185
Panko v. Rodak is an oft-cited case dismissing the PSL’s suit for mandamus
and damages against the Clerk of the Supreme Court and his assistant.186 The PSL
claimed the clerk had wrongfully refused to file his certiorari petition because it
failed to comply with the Court’s printing and jurisdictional statement rules.187 The
Seventh Circuit held that Panko did not establish a “clear right” to mandamus
relief, that the defendants were immune from money damages, and that, in
enforcing the Court's Rules and executing the Court's directives regarding the
docketing of cases “the defendants were carrying out judicial or quasi-judicial
functions within their authority.188
In Jones v. U.S. Supreme Court, the PSL filed two complaints in which he
named hundreds of defendants alleging that the Sharp Copier Company, among
others, perpetrated fraud on American consumers.189 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the complaints comprised “incomprehensible legal and factual assertions
against hundreds of defendants. His appellate briefs are filled with nonsensical
string cites to various authority and the arguments are fragmented contentions and
allegations. In addition, Jones does not state a reason for reversal of the district
court in either case.”190 The court affirmed the district court’s dismissals, because,
inter alia, “[e]ven if his appellate briefs were comprehensible, we would still affirm
the district court because the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. . . .
[Moreover,] he does not frame his arguments in a discernable fashion and, as such,
we will not construct his arguments for him.”191
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Skelton v. U.S. Supreme Court, C/A No. 3:13-465, 2013 WL 1768698, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2013).
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
Id.
606 F.2d 168, 168 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170–71.
Jones v. U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 96–3262, –3289, 1997 WL 267878, at *1 (7th Cir. May 7, 1997).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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In another oft-cited case upon which dismissals by suits against the Clerk of
the Supreme Court are based,192 a PSL claimed that “the Clerk erroneously rejected
certain of his filings, including a petition for writ of certiorari and an application to
proceed in forma pauperis, and [sought] mandamus and declaratory relief directing
the Clerk to accept his filings and to keep them confidential and affirming that the
Rules of the Supreme Court may be challenged in the district court.”193 The court
held:
We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a lower court
may compel the Clerk of the Supreme Court to take any action. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has inherent supervisory authority
over its Clerk. Thus, “it is the right and duty of the [Supreme] Court
. . . to correct the irregularities of its officer and compel him to perform
his duty.” We believe that this supervisory responsibility is exclusive
to the Supreme Court and that neither a district court nor a circuit
court of appeals has jurisdiction to interfere with it by mandamus or
otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing
Marin's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and deny his
mandamus petition.194
What can be said of these cases against the Supreme Court, individual
Justices, or its Clerk of Court? Clearly, the PSLs who filed these cases were
frustrated and angry over the manner in which they were treated by lower courts in
their litigation against third parties or by the Supreme Court itself in denying their
certiorari petitions. The anger may or may not be coupled with mental or emotional
instability. The question becomes, how can these litigants be “cooled down” in the
sense of being made to feel that their voice has been heard, consistent with
procedural justice and fairness? Does the Supreme Court have a duty to both (a)
provide guidance to lower courts regarding the extent to which they should assist
PSLs to ensure their right to self-representation can be meaningfully exercised and
(b) to establish its own programs of pro se assistance—in order to reduce the
frequency of the cases brought against it and other courts? I say yes to both.195
V.

VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS

Another category of PSLs posing a challenge to the Supreme Court beyond
those who sue it are vexatious litigants. The word “vexatious” is defined as “without
reasonable or probable cause or excuse; harassing; annoying.”196 A “vexatious suit”
is “[a] lawsuit instituted maliciously and without good cause.”197 Those PSLs who
sue the Court are problematic, but they are not necessarily vexatious. The Court’s
192
193
194
195
196
197

In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Id. at 340.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
See infra Part VI.
Vexatious, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Id.
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concern with vexatious litigants arises in the context of their invocation of the
statutory right to request a waiver of filing fees and costs.198
The federal statute governing IFP proceedings states: “any court of the
United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit,
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees
or security therefor.”199 In order to be granted the fee waiver, a prisoner (to which
the statute by its own terms is restricted) must submit an affidavit showing an
inability to pay the filing fee and costs of litigation. The affidavit under this section
“shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the
person is entitled to redress.”200 The statute prohibits fee waivers for appeals “if the
trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”201 While counsel for
the prisoner cannot be appointed, as such, the court “may request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel.”202
Most relevant here is the following provision, stating that the court may
dismiss an action brought by an IFP filer, when it determines: “(A) the allegation of
poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.”203 Of further relevance is the so-called
“three strikes” provision:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States
that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or

198
199

200
201
202
203

Research does not disclose any cases in the Supreme Court of non-indigent, represented vexatious litigants.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (1996). The statute, however, contains additional provisions indicating that the fee
waiver is not really a fee waiver. In other words:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis,
the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when
funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing
fee of 20 percent of the greater of-(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. The
agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the
clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
§ 1915(b)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). In a further contradiction, the statute provides that “[i]n no event shall a
prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason
that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” Id. (b)(4).
Id. (a)(1).
Id. (a)(3).
Id. (e)(1).
Id. (e)(2)(A)–(B).
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fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.204
The Supreme Court’s Rule 39 implements the IFP statute by requiring
prospective indigent prisoners to submit a motion, in accordance with the
requirements for all motions, asking for a waiver of fees.205 In 1991, Rule 39 was
amended to state that, “[i]f satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari,
jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ is frivolous or
malicious, the Court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”206 Justices
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented from the adoption of this amendment,
arguing that the amendment flies against the principle of equal justice for all
because it applies only to IFP filers, but not paid filers.207
The mere fact that an IFP motion is denied does not necessarily reflect upon
the merits of the accompanying certiorari petition. In other words, an IFP motion
204

205

206
207

Id. (g). Another means of addressing the problem of prisoners’ frivolous actions is the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), passed in 1995, which granted courts additional authority to dismiss prisoner
complaints regarding their conditions of confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2013). The principal
requirement imposed on prisoners in such cases is that they exhaust their administrative remedies. “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” §1997e(a). In addition, the PLRA states:
The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect
to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id. (c)(1). As the PLRA’s purpose is to dismiss filed complaints, as distinguished from certiorari petitions, it
does not apply to Supreme Court filings.
SUP. CT. R. 39.2. This rule requires an IFP motion to comply with Rule 21. Interestingly, this paragraph
goes on to state that “[a]s provided in that Rule, it suffices to file an original and 10 copies, unless the party
is an inmate confined in an institution and is not represented by counsel, in which case the original, alone,
suffices.” Id. (emphasis added). The implication is that, at the Supreme Court, an IFP filer need not be a
prisoner, in contrast with the IFP statute which is limited to prisoners.
SUP. CT. R. 39.8.
Justice Marshall stated that:
Strikingly absent from this Court's rules is any similar provision permitting dismissal of “frivolous
or malicious” filings by paying litigants, even though paying litigants are a substantial source of
these filings. This Court once had a great tradition: “All men and women are entitled to their day in
Court.” That guarantee has now been conditioned on monetary worth. It now will read: “All men and
women are entitled to their day in Court only if they have the means and the money.” I dissent.
In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 14–15 (1991)) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens wrote:
In my opinion it is neither necessary nor advisable to promulgate the foregoing amendment to Rule
39. During my years of service on the Court, I have not detected any significant burden on the Court,
or threat to the integrity of its processes, caused by the filing of frivolous petitions. It is usually much
easier to decide that a petition should be denied than to decide whether or not it is frivolous.
Moreover, the cost of administering the amended Rule will probably exceed any tangible
administrative saving. Transcending the clerical interest that supports the Rule is the symbolic
interest in preserving equal access to the Court for both the rich and the poor. I believe the Court
makes a serious mistake when it discounts the importance of that interest. I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 15. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could be denied for one or more of the following reasons: (a) the allegations of
poverty are untrue; (b) there is a technical deficiency causing a Rule 21 violation
(specifying requirements of motions); (c) the appeal does not fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction as described in Article III of the Constitution or the Court’s Rule 10,
stating the categories of cases it will accept for review;208 (d) the claim (as set forth
in the motion or accompanying petition) is frivolous; or (e) the claim is made by a
vexatious petitioner who had previously filed numerous frivolous petitions. There
are no data available reflecting the proportion of denied IFP motions that fall into
these categories.
There are, however, a handful of published opinions describing the Supreme
Court’s vexatious petitioners. The first case in which the Court invoked Rule 39.8
was Zatko v. California,209 which was a consolidation of two petitioners’ petitions
(Zatko and Martin). The Court noted:
Over the last 10 years, Zatko has filed 73 petitions in this Court; 34 of
those filings have come within the last 2 years. Martin has been only
slightly less prolific over the same 10–year period and has filed over
45 petitions, 15 of them within the last 2 years.210
The Court denied their IFP motions for their pending petitions but permitted them
to pay the filing fee and have their petitions considered; the Court cautioned them,
however, that “[f]uture similar filings from these petitioners will merit additional
measures.”211
In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun reiterated the objections they
made to adoption of Rule 39.8, namely, that it makes no sense that, in an effort to
avoid scarce judicial resources, the Court decided to rule on IFP motions first,
rather than just denying frivolous certiorari petitions before ruling on the
motions.212 That practice, the dissenters argued, only invites amended IFP motions
and more work for the Court.
[T]he symbolic effect of the Court's effort to draw distinctions among
the multitude of frivolous petitions—none of which will be granted in
any event—is powerful. Although the Court may have intended to
send a message about the need for the orderly administration of justice
and respect for the judicial process, the message that it actually
conveys is that the Court does not have an overriding concern about
equal access to justice for both the rich and the poor.

208
209
210

211
212

See infra Part VI. C.
502 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam).
Id. at 17. Subsequently, the Court described Martin as a “notorious abuser of this Court's certiorari
process,” noting he had, since the Zatko ruling, filed nine additional certiorari petitions. Martin v. D.C.
Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18.
See Id. at 19. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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By its action today, the Court places yet another barrier in the way of
indigent petitioners.213
A review of the cases in which the Court denied IFP motions shows that
every one of the filers were PSLs.214 They appear to be frustrated and angry over
prior adverse outcomes in cases brought in other courts, upset at the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to hear their claims, or have mental challenges. But their
number is small compared to the thousands of petitioners who seek judicial relief
from the Court annually.215 Future research, such as interviews of these vexatious
PSLs, is needed to establish their motivation and to find out what methods or
programs could have been established to avoid their multiple filings.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. Federal Courts’ Management of Pro Se Cases
An historical review of federal courts’ efforts to address the perceived rise in
prisoner pro se litigation reveals methods potentially adaptable to the Supreme
Court. In 1980, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) published its Recommended
Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in the Federal Courts
(Recommended Procedures),216 a product of the FJC’s Prisoner Civil Rights
Committee’s “[c]oncern over prisoner ‘conditions-of-confinement’ cases.”217 The
213

214

215
216

217

Id. at 19–20. In a footnote, the dissenters noted: “And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent
litigants, the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society's less fortunate members the
unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here.” Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (citing In re
Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (where petitioner had filed forty-eight previous
certiorari petitions).
See Whitfield v. Texas, 527 U.S. 885, 886 (1999) (eight previous petitions); Vey v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 937, 937
(1997) (twenty-six previous petitions); In re Gaydos, 519 U.S. 59, 60 (1996) (“Petitioner has a history of
frivolous, repetitive filings. She has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis 10 times, and she has
filed at least 8 other petitions. This most recent petition is nearly incomprehensible, and alludes to, among
other things, fraud by the staff of this Court and impending impeachment proceedings against Clerks
Walsh and Suter in the House of Representatives.”); Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297 (1996) (nine
previous petitions); id. at 297–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my
colleagues to return to ‘the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court's history prior to its
unprecedented decisions.’” (first citing In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989); then citing In re Sindram, 498
U.S. 177 (1991))); In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 365 (1994) (twenty-two petitions and motions, including
three petitions for certiorari, six motions for reconsideration, and thirteen petitions for extraordinary writs);
In re Sassower, 510 U.S. 4, 5 (1993) (twenty-one previous petitions); Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 290, 290
(1993) (forty-eight previous IFP motions); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 177–78, 180 (forty-three petitions and
motions, including twenty-one petitions for certiorari, sixteen petitions for rehearing, and two petitions for
extraordinary writs) (“Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of
judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations—filing fees and attorney's
fees—that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions.” (citing In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184
(1989) (noting that this PSL filed “73 separate filings with the Court, not including this petition, which is
his eighth so far this Term. These include 4 appeals, 33 petitions for certiorari, 99 petitions for
extraordinary writs, 7 applications for stays and other injunctive relief, and 10 petitions for rehearing.”));
Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89, 89 (1989) (twenty-two previous petitions).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1980), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/41/PrisCivR.pdf.
See id at vii.
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preface cites an earlier 1976 tentative report that recommended “experimentation
with certain innovative procedures such as the staff law clerk . . . and a standard
complaint form, with simple instructions” to be used in such prisoner cases.218 The
FJC had provided staff law clerks on a pilot basis to several district courts with a
large volume of such cases, leading to “early favorable reports.”219
The preface also referred to a second tentative report from 1977 based on the
FJC’s continued study of the use of staff law clerks, magistrates, a model complaint
form, systems for making counsel available, and other “methods of alleviating the
burden in the district courts in which approximately one out of every seven civil
cases filed is from a prisoner seeking various forms of relief.”220 The report notes
“[t]he need is to develop a definition of the proper role of the federal court in state
prisoner cases and to develop procedures that will ensure that the federal court can
effectively identify the meritorious case that is brought by a state prisoner.”221
Recommended Procedures went on to note that pro se prisoner cases are
“troublesome” because, without counsel, “most contain a wide variety of allegations
that are hard to separate and evaluate; and commonly the allegations are contained
in a long, often illegible, handwritten letter from the inmate. As a consequence, the
court found it difficult to understand the nature of the prisoner’s complaint.”222 The
report concludes with a number of recommendations: (1) court-approved forms for
use by prisoners filing pro se;223 (2) a centralized processing unit in the clerks’
offices for handling these complaints;224 (3) magistrates to assist the judge with
these cases;225 (4) assignment of a single judge to handle all cases by the same
prisoner;226 and (5) a series of forms for in forma pauperis applications.227
On the issue of processing prisoner pro se complaints, the report concluded
that magistrates, not staff law clerks, should be “the prime actor.”228 It noted the
experimental use of staff law clerks in three district courts was “uniquely positive,”
but stated magistrates can handle processing of these complaints “without the need
to develop a new layer of personnel.”229 The report found no need to dismantle the

218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

228
229

Id. at vii–viii.
Id. at viii.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
See id. at 51–53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54. Additional recommendations pertain to pro se complaint dismissals, service of complaints and
summons, procedure to prevent ex parte communications to the court, securing counsel for the pro se,
motion practice, dismissals for failure to prosecute, post-answer proceedings, requiring defense counsel to
submit a “special report” describing to the court the results of an investigation of PSLs’ claims, pretrial
conferences, and evidentiary hearings conducted by a magistrate. See generally id. at 54–86.
Id. at 52.
Id.
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existing staff law clerk positions, but stated that a magistrate “is the more
appropriate person to handle and process these cases.”230
In 1995, the Judicial Conference published its Long Range Plan for the
Federal Courts (Long Range Plan).231 The document contains a section on pro se
litigation that includes the following recommendation: “[s]teps must be taken to
confront the growing demands pro se litigation places on the federal courts.”232 The
following “implementation strategies” were proposed: (1) conduct “a broad-based
study, with participation from within and outside the courts, . . . to evaluate . . . and
recommend changes”; (2) explore “[a]lternative avenues for pro se prisoner
litigation”; (3) “develop workable standards for addressing the substantive and
procedural problems presented by pro se prisoner litigation”; and, (4) “make more
effective use of pro se law clerks.” 233 On the last recommendation, the Long Range
Plan explained that the use of a pro se law clerk “may be one answer to developing
sufficient expertise within the court to screen and recognize claims that deserve
further attention by the court. . . . The most effective use of pro se law clerks should
be studied and information about their effective use should be distributed
widely.”234 Thus, the plan contemplated pro se law clerks might be utilized in
various capacities.
In 1996, the FJC published another report entitled Resource Guide for
Managing Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation (Resource Guide).235 This 183-page report
changed references from “staff law clerks” in the earlier 1980 report to “pro se
clerks.”236 It focuses on the then-recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) and its implications for processing pro se prisoner cases.237 It also includes a
discussion of methods for effective management of prisoner litigation. The Resource
Guide presents seven such methods, some of which appeared in the earlier 1980
Recommended Procedures report:
•
•
•
•
•
230
231
232
233

234
235

236
237

procedures for facilitating efficient filing of prisoner cases;
court-based approaches for providing counsel to indigent prisoners;
court-annexed mediation programs;
litigation tracks for prisoner cases;
case-assignment systems;

Id. at 53.
See generally LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 52.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63–66. Noteworthy are the recommendations not directly addressed to court effiency in separating
meritorious versus frivolous. These were to study “ways . . . to provide better information to pro se litigants,
and the means to provide counsel to those who would otherwise proceed pro se.” Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.
See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, WITH
SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (1996) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE],
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/prisoner.pdf.
See id. at ix.
The PLRA affected the following six subject areas in prisoner litigation: “criteria for case screening and
dismissal; requirements for achieving IFP status; provisions affecting the management of cases; limitations
on relief; sanctions; and attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1.
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efficient use of court personnel; and
methods of reducing travel of prisoners to proceedings outside the
penal institution.238

Let us pause here and ask, are any of the aforementioned suggestions for
managing pro se prisoners adaptable to the Supreme Court? As to the first
recommendation above for efficient filing procedures, the Supreme Court currently
has a form for a pro se petition for certiorari and accompanying instructions posted
on its website.239 Interestingly, the Court’s own published guide for indigent pro se
litigants makes no mention of appointment of counsel.240 The Court, however,
appoints counsel for indigent PSLs where their certiorari petitions are granted.241
As to mediation, the Court is not likely to adopt such a program, given that it
is much easier to deny certiorari than to conduct mediations, and because many
district courts already have such programs.242 Nor is the Court likely to establish a
prisoner track for the same reason it would not adopt a mediation program, that is,
because that is considered a district court mechanism. An assignment system, used
by district courts to assign particular judges to prisoner cases, would also be
irrelevant. Reducing travel of prisoners to courts is also irrelevant to the Court in
these days of Skype and Zoom. Thus, of these methods the most relevant to possible
adoption by the Supreme Court is the recommendation for efficient use of court
personnel.
Use of magistrate judges is discussed in the Resource Guide under the
“efficient use of court personnel” section, but, given that their use is limited by
statute to district courts,243 the Supreme Court does not have the option of
employing its own magistrates. The most relevant discussion, therefore, focuses on
pro se law clerks. Noting that in some districts personnel who handle pro se filings
are alternatively referred to as “staff attorneys,” the report encourages courts to
“examine whether they are entitled to any additional pro se law clerk positions
238
239

240
241

242

243

Id. at 7.
Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, Guide for Prospective Indigent Petitioners for Writs
of Certiorari (2019) [hereinafter Guide], https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforIFPcases2019.pdf.
See generally id.
See, e.g., 2019 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 11 (“No. 18–7739. Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez, Petitioner v. United States.
Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted, and Philip J. Lynch, Esq., of San Antonio, Texas, is
appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.”),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl19.pdf. These appointments of counsel, as such, are not
“requests” for representation of a petitioner authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Note, however, the Court
has ruled that counsel may not be compelled to take the case for which representation was “requested.”
Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301–08 (1989).
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF
CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES 1, 29 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 SURVEYS],
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ProSeUSDC.pdf (noting that 21 of 61 responding district courts
have mediation programs for prisoners or nonprisoners (or both) and 55.7% of responding chief judges have
referred nonprisoner pro se cases to mediation for settlement discussions).
See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (“The judges of each United States district court and the district courts of the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands shall appoint United States magistrate judges in such
numbers and to serve at such locations within the judicial districts as the Judicial Conference may
determine under this chapter.”).
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based on their caseloads, needs, and the relevant policies established by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.”244
In 2011, the FJC published a third report addressing the challenge PSLs
present to federal courts entitled Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District
Courts: A Report on Surveys of Clerks of Court and Chief Judges (2011 Surveys).245
The report presents data from surveys administered to ninety court clerks’ offices
and sixty-one chief district court judges.246 It provides a comprehensive view of the
state of pro se assistance in federal courts, presented in thirty-one data tables on
every possible aspect of pro se assistance. The most salient findings can be
summarized as follows:
•
•

•

•

•

244

245

246

In over one-half of clerks’ office, some form of pro assistance is
provided.
The most common form of pro se assistance in over one-third of
the offices is staff training programs, the most common
“clarify[ing] what is permissible and impermissible assistance to
pro se litigants or explain[ing] how to deal with angry or upset
pro se litigants.”
Twenty percent of the offices have changed staff duties or their
organization to provide pro se assistance by “designating specific
staff to handle all pro se cases, rotating the responsibility for pro
se cases, or referring pro se litigants to outside help.”
In the clerks’ view, the “most effective” reforms for their offices
are “designat[ing]staff for specific duties . . . [,] providing specially
tailored information to pro se litigants . . . [and] making
information and guidance tailored to the litigant, such as
standardized forms, instructions, and handbooks, readily
available.”
One-third of the clerks noted “constraints or difficulties in
handling pro se litigation.” The most common of these had to do
with “the policies and practices” or corrections departments at the
state and federal level, most notably the “lack of cooperation in
providing materials electronically and prisoners’ lack of access to

RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 235, at 12. The Judicial Conference is convened annually by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and comprises “the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of
International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). Its functions
are, inter alia, to “make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of the United
States and prepare plans for assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary. It shall
also submit suggestions and recommendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management
procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business.” Id. It appears the Judicial Conference has
authority to propose suggestions and recommendations to “various courts,” which would include the
Supreme Court.
2011 SURVEYS, supra note 242. Rather than viewing pro se assistance as a challenge for court clerks, this
report refers to results of a survey of court clerks about services to reduce “the burden of pro se cases.” Id. at
v, viii.
Id. at 5, 39 n.2.
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computers or forms,” including the lack of access to CM/ECF and
PACER.
Some unresolved problems relate to the PSLs themselves, such as
“submissions that are hard to read, are incomplete, or whose
issues cannot be discerned; an increase in pro se filings, repeat
filers, and frivolous filings; [and] difficult or unstable litigants.”
Coupled with the sheer volume of filings, these issues place a
heavy demand on clerks.247

The first four of these findings evidence the role specialization established in many
clerks’ offices to manage PSLs, as well as development of simplified forms and
guidebooks for them. The Supreme Court presumably has similarly designated staff
in the office of the Clerk of Court, and provides its Guide to assist PSLs.248 The
enumerated constraints and difficulties noted by the surveyed court clerks involving
repeat filers, frivolous pleadings, lack of prisoners’ access to computers, and
managing unstable PSLs are common to the Supreme Court, as well.
In the 2011 Surveys, a majority of the responding Chief Judges coalesced
around certain major issues with PSLs. On the papers, the judges were concerned
with the intelligibility of PSL pleadings and responses to summary judgment
motions. In general, the judges noted that PSLs lack crucial knowledge about
precedents or information that would help their cases; fail to object when faced with
testimony or evidence; and struggle to understand certain “legal consequences of
their actions or inactions,” such as requests for admissions, statutes of limitations,
and other timeliness problems.249
The report also notes the judges’ views on the different challenges they face
in prisoner versus non-prisoner PSL cases:
Prisoner and non-prisoner pro se cases do not necessarily present the
same issues for chambers. Prisoner cases present special problems in
discerning the substance of the case, whereas non-prisoner cases
present special issues involving the litigants themselves, who are
more likely than prisoner pro se litigants to demand things a court
cannot provide or to be irrational, unreasonable, or mentally unstable.
Judges identified procedural problems as being present in both
prisoner and non-prisoner pro se cases, but they noted that frivolous
cases or logistical problems pose more of a problem for prisoner
cases.250
Two-thirds or more of the judges stated they utilize the following assistance
methods: (1) “broad standards in construing pleadings and other submissions”; (2)
“acceptance of letters as motions or pleadings”; (3) “appointment of counsel only
247
248
249
250

Id. at vi.
See 2011 SURVEYS, supra note 239.
Id. at 21–24.
Id. at vii.
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when the merits of the case warrant it”; (4) “referral of pretrial matters to
magistrate judges”; (5) a “more active personal role than in fully represented cases”;
and (6) “use of broad standards in requiring compliance with deadlines.”251 The
Supreme Court also interprets PSL pleadings liberally, probably construes letters
as motions or pleadings, and appoints counsel where warranted.252 But it has no
statutory authority to appoint federal magistrate judges. It cannot get more
personally involved by definition. And it is unlikely to excuse rule non-compliance
absent good cause.
In 2015, the Judicial Conference of the U.S. published its Strategic Plan for
the Federal Judiciary.253 The summary of the nineteen-page plan states that it
“takes into consideration various trends and issues affecting the judiciary, many of
which challenge or complicate the judiciary’s ability to perform its mission
effectively.”254 Given how much space the previous Judicial Conference reports
devoted to the issue of PSLs, one could safely assume the scope of the report would
include pro se litigation. But PSLs are only mentioned twice in the report. The first
mention appears in a discussion of a strategy to protect judges, court staff, and the
public in courts: “Threats extend beyond the handling of criminal cases, as violent
acts have often involved pro se litigants and other parties to civil cases.”255
The second mention is under the heading Enhancing Access to the Judicial
Process, where the report includes a strategy to “[e]nsure that the federal judiciary
is open and accessible to those who participate in the judicial process.”256 The
background paragraph describes existing approaches to access, including court
forms that have been “rewritten in an effort to make them clearer and simpler to
use,” and the adoption in some districts of “electronic tools to assist pro se filers in
generating civil complaints.”257 One of the stated goals under this strategy is to
“[d]evelop best practices for handling claims of pro se litigants in civil and
bankruptcy cases.”258 Nothing further is written about the challenge of pro se
litigation, pro se law clerks, or the Supreme Court.
Much greater detail regarding courts’ efforts to address the pro se challenge
is presented in the FJC’s 2016 publication entitled Pro Se Case Management for
Nonprisoner Civil Litigation (Pro Se Case Management).259 This comprehensive
manual covers the waterfront of pro se case management in the lower federal
courts. In it, the Supreme Court is not mentioned in the context of the pro se

251
252
253

254
255
256
257
258
259

Id. at 30.
See supra notes 63, 82 discussion and accompanying text.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federaljudiciary_2015strategicplan.pdf.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRO SE CASE MANAGEMENT FOR NONPRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION (2016),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/Pro_Se_Case_Management_for_Nonprisoner_Civil_Litigation.pdf.
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challenge and how to address it. Instead, the author discusses the Court only in so
far as its rulings on interpretation of PSL pleadings.260
Before describing the extant pro se case management techniques, the manual
reviews the principles of “procedural fairness”:
The goal of procedural fairness is for all litigants, whether
represented or not, to feel that they:
1. have a voice in the process, are given the opportunity to be heard,
are listened to, and have genuine input into the decision-making
process;
2. understand what is happening and what they are supposed to do
through each stage of the litigation;
3. are treated with respect and on an equal footing with attorneys
and represented parties; and,
4. are treated fairly by the judge (and the judicial system in general)
in a neutral, unbiased fashion.261
Taking these useful concepts in order, point 1—on giving voice to the PSL— is, like
the remainder of the manual, addressed to federal trial judges. Giving PSLs an
opportunity to speak, and patiently listening to them, is not something a Supreme
Court Justice can do. Providing clear explanations of the process and the PSL’s
obligations (point 2) is discussed under two subheadings: (a) avoiding legalese, and
(b) explaining the process.262 Judges should avoid legalese orally and in written
materials, including decisions and orders.263
260

261

262
263

See id. at 103–05. The report reviewed the evolution of the Court’s opinions regarding pleadings rules, from
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief”), to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(announcing a stricter “plausibility” standard that requires “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”), followed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (holding that the rule in
Twombly is not limited to antitrust cases, but applies to all civil cases). The report notes that none of these
were PSL cases, but that in subsequent cases, the Court held that PSLs’ complaints were still entitled to
liberal construction. WOOD, supra note 259, at 103–04 (first citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam); then citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (acknowledging,
in nonprisoner case, that “pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties”)).
Id. at 3–4. On the last point, a footnote cautions:
These concerns apply mainly to what some have termed “good faith” pro se litigants—those who have
a genuine complaint, whether ultimately successful or not, and who look to the courts to provide a
fair venue for airing it. Those who engage in vexatious or harassing litigation, or seek to make a
political statement, are likely less interested in the fairness of the process than in winning, making
a point, or carrying on a grudge.
Id. at 3 n.19.
Id. at 9–14.
Id. at 10. Prof. Rabeea Assy, however, argues:
[T]he Plain English movement has idealized and exaggerated the potential benefits of plain
language, propagating a mistaken belief that the law can speak directly to its subjects merely by
simplifying its language. . . . Litigation is the paradigmatic example of a setting where using the law
effectively requires skills and expertise far beyond understanding the words used to communicate it.
Simplifying the language used to convey procedural and substantive laws has not made and cannot
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While it is judges who should explain the trial process, the order of
presentation of proof, and evidentiary rulings to PSLs (usually at pretrial
conferences), much information can be provided by other means listed. In addition
to forms and instructional guides, these include: self-help kiosks, legal advice at a
pro se clinic, and pro bono assistance programs.264 A court clerk can educate a PSL
and give him or her a greater understanding of the process, which the book states
“can start [PSLs] off on a positive note.”265 As we have seen, the Supreme Court’s
Clerk of Court at present merely provides a set of instructions for IFP filers, and
nothing more.266
Points 3 (treat all litigants with equal respect) and 4 (provide neutral,
unbiased treatment) would appear to be irrelevant to the Supreme Court because of
the lack of Justices’ personal interaction with PSLs. However, many PSLs probably
feel they are not treated as well as represented petitioners given the paucity of legal
assistance programs established for them.267 For the same reason many probably
feel they are not treated in a neutral, unbiased manner; they no doubt perceive the
adversarial system to be biased in favor of represented parties, which we know it
is.268 So, the Supreme Court should, like other federal courts, take steps to reduce
these perceptions of an uneven playing field on the part of pro se petitioners, as it
continues to grant only a small portion of the certiorari petitions it receives.
Pro Se Case Management has a few additional points that are relevant to pro
se litigation in the Supreme Court. Suggestions for managing such cases before
docketing include standardized forms, pro se guides or manuals, and early

264
265
266
267

268

make the law sufficiently intelligible for laypeople to litigate their cases effectively, because a good
deal of complexity inherent in the law cannot be reduced to questions of language and style.
Analysing the difficulties that litigation poses for laypeople reveals complexities that cannot be
eliminated by simplification of language. Understanding these complexities requires specialised
skills other than an ability to penetrate technical language, such as the ability to identify the
pertinent legal rules, principles and doctrines, to recognise relevant facts and classify them into the
pertinent legal categories, and to engage in a particular type of interpretation and reasoning.
RABEEA ASSY, INJUSTICE IN PERSON: THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 74 (2015) (proposing mandatory
representation for all civil litigants except for the simplest of cases).
WOOD, supra note 259, at 11–13.
Id. at 6.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
The report describes numerous approaches to pro se case management, but, as to legal assistance, it notes
that only “several” federal courts provide legal assistance or coaching to PSLs. “Generally, such programs
offer an initial consultation with an attorney or paralegal in the courthouse but vary in how much further
assistance may be provided.” WOOD, supra note 259, at 34; see also, Jerome B. Simandle, Enhancing Access
to ADR for Unrepresented Litigants: Federal Court Programs Provide Models for Helping Pro Se Parties—
and the Justice System, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 6, 8–10 (describing the four district courts with
pro se clinics in which pro bono attorneys provide legal advice and limited representation).
See Stephan Landsman, Pro Se Litigation, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 (2012).
Over the course of the three or four centuries of the adversary system’s expansion, first in England
and then in the United States, lawyers have come to seem indispensable in the mounting of litigation.
Although not mandated by adversary theory, counsel has come to be seen as an essential component
of the system.
Id. at 232.
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screening.269 The last of these is most relevant, because forms and manuals may
themselves be difficult to understand by a pro se petitioner. Early screening in the
district courts is accomplished in some courts by pro se law clerks. They screen
complaints to check on the appropriateness of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and venue; they also provide procedural advice to the Court, suggesting
amendments to avoid termination, and looking for frivolousness.270 If pro bono
lawyers can be recruited, they can perform the early screening to do these things,
but they can go even further: they can advise PSLs with frivolous claims “not to file
at all.”271 As one federal judge stated at a pro se conference:
Having a walk-in clinic means that these people who are adrift and
angry very often, and fearful always, are able to talk with a human
being who can provide support, or at least guidance, and treat them
with a sense of dignity and respect, which they often seldom
encounter. That makes them more receptive to the principles, the
rules, the filing requirements, the technicalities, because they’ve been
given a chance to be heard and to be considered.272
Needing even more “dignity and respect” are those PSLs who have mental
challenges, delusions, and the like.273 These, no doubt, are the vast majority of PSLs
who sue the Supreme Court. Pro Se Case Management notes that these individuals
may or may not have a valid claim, but they are nevertheless entitled to “respectful
treatment.”274
Some PSLs may also be characterized as “abusive litigants,” who may or may
not have mental challenges, but who file repeated frivolous or vexatious papers,
deliberately delay proceedings, or fail to prosecute.275 It is impossible to generalize
about these litigants. Some are indeed malicious filers who have a lot of time on
their hands. The various suggested approaches to manage them include imposing
sanctions, providing firm, fair, and clear warnings, or “expressing sympathy with
the intensity of the emotion [which] may reduce the litigant’s alienation.”276
269
270
271
272
273

274

275
276

WOOD, supra note 259, at 26–36.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
See id. at 95–96 (“While these cases may be at the extreme end of the pro se spectrum, federal judges are all
too familiar with frivolous or delusional claims of one variety or another.”).
Id. at 97–98. Quoting an article on ethical opinion writing:
Judges must be careful to treat distraught litigants, including mentally challenged or even
delusional litigants, with respect. Delusional litigants are, regrettably, common enough that lawreview articles have been written about them. The issue for the opinion writer—recalling that how
a judge writes counts as much ethically as what a judge decides—is how to resolve these claims . . .
. A judge should treat the court system and the litigants with dignity. In doing so, the judge will gain
the readers’ trust and assure them that all litigants will be treated equally.
Id. at 98 (alteration in original) (citing Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial
Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 280 (2008)).
Id.
Id. at 98–99.
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Whether the pro se certiorari petitioners are mentally or emotionally challenged,
abusive, or incompetent, they may simply be upset about how they have been
treated in the lower courts.
B. Supreme Court’s Pro Se Assistance
i. Filing Instructions
In an effort to determine whether the Supreme Court assists or
accommodates PSLs in any way, I emailed its Public Information Office and asked
the following questions:
1. Does the Court employ "pro se law clerks" which are employed by
various district and circuit courts? If so, please advise as to their
duties, how many are so employed, and other relevant information
about how they are used.
2. Does the Court provide pro se litigants with forms to assist them in
filing their petitions for certiorari, motions, or their briefs if their cases
are accepted for review?
3. Does the Court appoint or request counsel to represent pro se
petitioners in all cases that are accepted for review?
4. Which, if any, technical requirements in the Court's rules for
submission of petitions for certiorari, motions, or briefs are ever (or
routinely) waived for pro se petitioners?277
I received the following unresponsive response from that office:
We are responding to your email to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Court’s Public Information Office is unable to assist in the
matter that you present. The Public Information Office cannot
perform research for its correspondents. You may wish to view
information on filing and rules on the Court’s website, which may go
a long way in answering your general questions: https://www.
supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/. To further your inquiry, you may
find helpful sites such as www.findlaw.com and www.law.cornell.edu,
or you may wish to visit a library.278
A visit to the website to which I was referred eventually led me to the only
document that had anything to do with PSLs, namely, the Court’s Guide for
Prospective Indigent Petitioners for Writs of Certiorari.279 The Guide contains a sixpage explanation of the process for filing petitions for certiorari, appended to which
are (1) a model Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, (2) a five-page
277

278

279

Email from Jona Goldschmidt, Professor of Criminal Justice & Criminology, Loyola Univ. Chi, to Supreme
Court Pub. Info. Office (Oct. 1, 2018) (via PIO internal inquiry system) (on file with author).
Email from Supreme Court Pub. Info. Office to author, Professor of Criminal Justice & Criminology (Oct. 3,
2018, 01:41 CST) (on file with author).
Guide, supra note 239.

2020]

Who Sues the Supreme Court, and Why?

229

blank affidavit in support of the motion which requires a petitioner and his or her
spouse to declare all of their assets and liabilities, and (3) a twelve-page blank
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.280
The Introduction to the Guide explains that it is “designed to assist
petitioners who are proceeding in forma pauperis and without assistance of
counsel,”281 but does not explain the meaning of this first Latin term. The Guide
explains that the writ of certiorari “is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. The primary concern of the Supreme Court is not to correct errors in
lower court decisions, but to decide cases presenting issues of importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved,”282 but it never defines this second Latin
term, either. It warns the reader that the Court grants petitions for certiorari “in
only about 1% of the cases that are filed,” and that the vast majority of cases “are
simply denied by the Court without comment or explanation.”283
Additional sections of the first part of the Guide explain the time for filing,
what to file, the page limitation, redaction of personal information, and the method
of filing.284 The Guide provides detailed instructions for completing the appended
forms, that is, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the affidavit in
support, and the certiorari petition.285 The contents of the petition itself are the
same for any litigant: the cover page, the question(s) presented, a list of parties, a
table of contents, an index of appendices, the table of authorities, the opinions
below, jurisdiction, constitutional and statutory provisions involved, a statement of
the case, the reasons for granting the writ, the conclusion, and the proof of service.
Needless to say, the warning given to prospective petition filers about the low
probability of relief, coupled with the complex procedures described in the Guide—
with cross-references to the Court’s rules—would be disheartening to any PSL, and
it is questionable whether most of the PSLs are even able to understand and comply
with these procedures.286 It is telling, too, that the Court Public Information Office
had no answers to my inquiries regarding whether the Court employs pro se law
clerks, whether it provides assistance beyond the Guide, whether it appoints
counsel for PSLs whose cases are accepted for review, or whether it waives the
technical requirements of the certiorari procedures. The Court apparently provides
no assistance to PSLs beyond the Guide.
ii. Pro Se Law Clerks
Some of the strategies described in the Judicial Conference and Federal
Judicial Center reports have the potential of being implemented by the Supreme
280
281
282
283
284
285
286

Id. at 8–25.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1–3.
Id. at 3–6.
This is evidenced by some of the cases cited supra notes 173–180 and accompanying text, involving
unintelligible pleadings.
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Court. As a matter of fairness, consistency, and justice, the Supreme Court should
adopt those strategies to help pro se petitioners navigate the certiorari process
which other federal courts have found to be effective in educating and guiding PSLs
regarding the federal rules of procedure and evidence, and rules of courtroom
decorum.287 One of these is the use of pro se law clerks, who are utilized in almost
all federal district courts. It should be noted that the titles given these individuals
who are assigned pro se cases vary from court to court, from “pro se law clerk” (used
in district courts) to “staff attorney” or “pro se staff attorney” (used in circuit
courts).288
Pro se law clerks and staff attorneys are distinguishable from judicial (or
“elbow”) clerks.289 Staff attorneys have been critically described as a “predominantly
recently-graduated corps of . . . attorneys, to whom the federal appellate bench de
facto delegates a significant majority of its Article III judicial power, and over whom
it does not exercise meaningful supervision.”290 Within the subset of staff attorneys,
who do not work directly with individual judges like judicial clerks, many are
assigned to primarily review new PSL pleadings.291
Judge Posner’s recent book explores the ways many district and circuit
courts have used pro se staff attorneys since the late 1970s to assist them with
PSLs.292 In this book, Judge Posner not only criticizes his former Seventh Circuit
staff attorneys for their poor grammar used in proposed orders, and their “verbosity
and mindless repetition.”293 He bemoans the fact that his court often provides no
“articulate, intelligible explanation” for turning down a PSL’s appeal, leaving the
PSL “in the dark, without guidance to what if any future course of action he may be
able to pursue . . . [and] in short may leave him disillusioned about the federal

287

288
289

290
291

292
293

2011 SURVEYS, supra note 242, at 12 (“[O]nly 4 of the 90 responding districts reported that they did not
have such staff.”).
Katherine A. Macfarlane, A New Approach to Local Rules, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 121, 148–49 (2015).
Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law,
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 47–48 (2007). Pether notes judicial clerks were institutionalized in the face of a crisis in
judicial workload, while staff attorney institutionalization was a response to the crisis of the extension of
the right to counsel and the growth of prisoner litigation. Id. at 47 (citing Donald P. Ubell, Report on
Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253, 255 (1980)).
Id. at 10.
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LAW CLERK HANDBOOK § 7.8 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter LAW CLERK HANDBOOK],
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/26/Law_Clerk_Handbook_Revised_3d_Ed_2017.pdf (first
reciting the duties of a pro se law clerk: “assist[ing] the [district] court by screening the complaints and
petitions for substance, analyzing their merits, and preparing recommendations and orders for judicial
action, including orders of dismissal. Many pro se law clerks also work on nonprisoner pro se cases”; then
the duties of staff attorneys in each circuit: “[w]orking on pro se prisoner and other pro se cases, including
reviewing correspondence from pro se litigants in order to determine whether any communications are
legally sufficient to constitute an appeal or a request for mandamus”).
POSNER, supra note 84.
Id. at 39–40. For this, he blames “law-school writing programs and the general culture of today’s America.”
Id. at 122.
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courts and with no clue as to how he might continue and improve his efforts to
alleviate his situation.”294
Judge Posner’s book includes a spreadsheet of information about all circuits’
staff attorney programs.295 The spreadsheet provides a wide range of information
about the staff attorney programs for federal circuit courts, including their various
functions. It also shows that none of the circuit courts’ staff attorneys have any
direct communication with pro se appellants.296
Many of the cases filed against the Supreme Court are brought by unhappy
and angry (but not always vexatious) PSLs. These litigants believe justice was not
done in their case at the Supreme Court level, or previously in lower courts. The
question is, what models of pro se assistance programs will not only reduce the
“burden” on court clerks and judges, but also ameliorate the anger and frustration
of PSLs who feel that justice was not done in their case? The multitude of out-ofcourt assistance programs described above adopted by many federal district and
circuit courts purport to educate and guide PSLs, but they do not address this
problem.
PSLs obviously require instruction and guidance in order to navigate the
justice system. In addition, they should be afforded limited-scope representation,
coaching, or ghostwriting services to help level the playing field when litigating
against a represented party.297 But, absent pro bono legal services external to the
court, and excluding the rare case in which the Court appoints counsel for a PSL
whose certiorari petition is granted,298 what can the Supreme Court do to address
the problem of anger and frustration on the part of PSLs that prompts them to
become vexatious litigants or plaintiff in suits against the Court?
One approach might be to employ pro se law clerks. Currently used in district
and circuit courts, these clerks primarily draft proposed orders ruling on IFP
petitions, addressing the sufficiency of pleadings filed by PSLs, and other
preliminary matters. The FJC’s Law Clerk Handbook contains a section on pro se
law clerks, indicating that their general duties are complaint screening, analyzing
their merits, and preparing recommendations and orders for judicial action. It notes
that, on occasion, PSLs will send letters to the court. “If the correspondence . . . does

294

295

296

297

298

Id. at 41. Judge Posner would like courts to “explain what if any alternative route to relief that a pro se may
have, thus enabling him, if there is such a route, to file a new proceeding in federal district court with a
well-founded belief that this time he may (not that he is certain to) prevail.” Id. at 124. The PSL “may have
alternatives; he may have sued under the wrong statute; he may have sued the wrong people; he may have
been ignorant of the most basic rudiments of litigation. We owe it to him to explain what his alternatives
may be—how the next time he may prevail.” Id. at 139.
Id. at 161–67. The number of staff attorneys ranges from a low of eighteen in the First Circuit to a high of
eighty in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 162–63.
Cf. 2011 SURVEYS, supra note 242, at 1 n.5 (indicating that only one district court chief judge surveyed
reported a pro se assistance program permitting pro se clerks to communicate directly with PSLs).
As for ghostwriting, they should be able to do so without having to fear charges of unethical conduct. See
Jona Goldschmidt, Ghosting: It’s Time to Find Uniformity on Ghostwriting, 102 JUDICATURE 37, 48 (2018).
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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not present an issue that may be considered by the court, the staff attorney may be
authorized to so advise the author.”299
According to the 2011 Surveys, 25 district courts permit direct
communication between pro se law clerks and PSLs.300 An examination of recent
pro se law clerk position announcements by federal courts reveal a wide range of
duties, indicating more or less contact with PSLs. For example, one announcement
lists duties that do not include any contact with PSLs.301 Another states that the
pro se law clerks work for the district court’s Office of Pro Se Litigation, but their
duties do not include direct contact with PSLs.302 One states that the clerk will have
a variety of duties involving contacts with PSLs:
The pro se law clerk provides objective advice to judges, chambers, and
court staff and provides information to litigants and attorneys . . . This
position does not involve representing clients or providing advice to
pro se litigants . . . . [The clerk] [p]rovides procedural information to
pro se litigants or counsel by responding to questions. . . . [The clerk]
[m]aintains liaison between the court and litigants . . . [and]
[m]aintains communication with other courts, state and federal
agencies, counsel, litigants, and court staff regarding court rules and
procedural issues, calendaring and other litigation matters.303
Then, another court notes in its position announcement that “[t]he law clerk will
perform legal research, draft reports, recommendations, and proposed orders.
Additionally, the law clerk will help plan and implement a federal pro se program
aimed at developing and coordinating assistance to pro se litigants.”304
Pro se law clerks’ and staff attorneys’ duties could be expanded to include
direct contact with PSLs for the purposes of explaining to them the deficiencies, if
299
300
301

302

303

304

LAW CLERK HANDBOOK, supra note 291, at 126.
2011 SURVEYS, supra note 242, at 2 tbl.1.
[The clerk’s] duties may include, but are not limited to, initial review, screening and analysis of
prisoner and other pro se cases and drafting of appropriate legal documents; legal research and
drafting of proposed Orders or Reports and Recommendations; preparing legal memoranda for the
supervising judge’s review and consideration; and such other duties as may be assigned by the
designated supervising judge or the Chief Judge.
Position Announcement for Pro Se Law Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for D.S.C. (Aug. 17, 2017) (on file with
author).
The Office of Pro Se Litigation serves the District and Magistrate Judges of the Court in the handling
of all cases filed by individuals who are representing themselves in court. It provides legal support
to the Court’s judges to assist them in managing their pro se docket (which accounts for
approximately 25% of the Court’s civil filings). Pro se law clerks review initial pro se filings and draft
legal memoranda and proposed orders and decisions for judicial officers. Pro se law clerks report
directly to the Chief Counsel of the Office of Pro Se Litigation.
Pro Se Law Clerk Position Announcement, S.D.N.Y. (Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with author).
Pro Se Law Clerk Vacancy Announcement, N.D. FLA. (emphasis added),
http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17%20NDFL%20PT%20Pro%20Se%20Law%20Clerk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4F6Y-Y9A7].
Pro Se/Term Law Clerk Position Description Announcement, D. ALASKA (July 12, 2018) (emphasis added),
https://www.akd.uscourts.gov/sites/akd/files/Pro%20Se%20Term%20Law%20Clerk%20Position.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EEL-JQKA].
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any, of their filed pleadings, briefs, etc. Alternatively, a new ombudsman-like
position could be created by the courts to carry out that function. A personal contact
with the PSLs by a court official would satisfy the need for giving PSLs their “voice”
and may, in many cases, de-escalate the anger and frustration many PSLs exhibit
when courts dismiss their claims on various technical grounds (which they may or
may not understand).
The Supreme Court currently has no pro se law clerks. The Court should
establish these positions as the Judicial Conference has authorized for district and
circuit courts. These clerks could explain, if contacted by PSLs, why their certiorari
petitions were either rejected or denied. Communication about these matters may
be made through the mail, email, telephone contact, or via two-way video
conferencing; contact via telephone or video-conferencing would add a personal
touch and would be a more effective form of communication by enhancing a PSL’s
voice in the process. Arrangements could be made with prisons, both state and
federal, for these kinds of direct communications with PSLs. While some
commentators decry the use of staff attorneys or pro se clerks as “shadow judges,”305
expansion of their duties or hiring of new staff to communicate directly with PSLs
as I suggest, will reduce the likelihood of the filing (or promote early termination of)
suits against the Court its Justices, and the Clerk of Court.306
Budgetary issues will certainly arise in considering this proposal. As an
alternative to hiring additional court staff to directly communicate with PSLs in the
district courts, circuit courts, or Supreme Court, law students could be recruited to
explain to PSLs in plain English the reasons for dismissal of their cases or the
denial of their certiorari petitions. Under supervision, these students could also
provide them with available options, as Judge Posner would want done. The
proposal would obviously require the adoption of rules governing the scope of
information provided and addressing ethical issues, such as avoiding unauthorized
practice and permitting distribution of alternative legal remedies information
(without advisement as to which is the best approach for the PSL). Some law
schools already have appellate and Supreme Court practice clinics that represent
parties who might otherwise be PSLs.307
305

306

307

See Katherine A. Macfarlane, Shadow Judges: Staff Attorney Adjudication of Prisoner Claims, 95 OR. L.
REV. 97 (2016) (arguing that federal judges have abdicated their Art. III powers to staff attorneys).
This proposed specialized set of pro se law clerks has some precedent in the “cert pool” process utilized by
the Court to screen certiorari petitions. In that process the Chief Justice divides up the Court’s task of
screening the over 7,000 petitions for certiorari across the Justices’ chambers, except for Justices Alito and
Gorsuch who decline to participate, preferring their clerks read all the petitions. See, e.g., Kenton J. Skarin,
An Insider's Look Within The U.S. Supreme Court: A U.S. Supreme Court Clerk's Revelations, 30 DCBA
BRIEF, Apr. 2018, at 8, 8, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.dcba.org/resource/resmgr/brief_pdf/
brief_april_2018-2.pdf (“Regardless of the type of petition, the goal of every clerk writing for the cert. pool is
to provide the Justices a concise summary of the parties' arguments and a recommendation regarding
certiorari as quickly as possible.”).
See Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/clinical/clinics/supremecourt-litigation-clinic/ (last visited May 15, 2020); Appellate & Supreme Court Clinic, WM & MARY L. SCH.,
https://law.wm.edu/academics/programs/jd/electives/clinics/appellate/index.php (last visited May 15, 2020);
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, U. VA. SCH. L., https://www.law.virginia.edu/academics/clinic/supreme-
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Consistency in procedural and substantive justice demands that the longstanding use of pro se law clerks in the district courts and staff attorneys in circuit
courts be expanded to the Supreme Court. There is no reason to limit their use in
the lower courts, especially given the number of certiorari petitions filed in and
denied by the Supreme Court. Such clerks in the district courts who provide direct
explanations to PSLs about the lack of merit in their cases may also reduce the
number of suits against the Supreme Court. They can explain that the justice
system requires finality, and that collateral attacks on prior dismissals or certiorari
petitions are not permitted, but that there may be alternatives available to them.
These may include refiling using intelligible pleadings, filing under a different
statute, filing with a state or federal administrative agency, mediation, or other
solutions.
Concurrent with this approach, the Supreme Court should accept more cases
involving management of PSLs, either brought by them or on their behalf from
circuit court decisions if they are fortunate to have had counsel appointed on appeal.
The judiciary needs greater guidance regarding the extent to which judges provide
required, permissible, or impermissible forms of guidance, accommodations, and
other forms of assistance, while maintaining their impartiality, given the Court’s
mixed messages on this subject.308
C. Amendment to Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Rule
to Include Miscarriages of Justice
Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution provides: “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court.” That power extends “to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution.”309 Article III further
provides that, except for cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, and
those in which a state is a party, “the [S]upreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”310 The italicized words plainly state that
both legal issues and factual issues are within the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s
own jurisdictional rule, however, restricts its review of “fact-based” appeals.311

308

309
310
311

court-litigation-clinic (last visited May 15, 2020). Inmate legal assistance clinics, like the one at the Indiana
University Maurer School of Law, can also play a significant role in pro se certiorari petitioner advisement.
See Inmate Legal Assistance Project, IND. U. MAURER SCH. L.,
https://www.law.indiana.edu/academics/experiential-education/projects/inmate.shtml (last visited May 15,
2020).
See supra Part III. I have argued elsewhere that ultimately the Court should establish a judicial duty of
reasonable assistance to PSLs, see Jona Goldschmidt, Required, Permissible, And Impermissible Forms of
Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Toward Establishment of a Judicial Duty of Reasonable
Assistance, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 217 (2019), as exists in Canada, see Jona Goldschmidt,
Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 601 (2008-09).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”).
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The certiorari process is one of the “regulations” Congress established
pursuant to Article III. Federal law provides that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by . . . writ of certiorari granted upon the
petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of
judgment or decree”; similar provisions apply to the review of state and other courts’
decisions.312 PSLs are most likely to seek review of their cases either under the
“arising under” clause, in appeals of civil rights or employment cases, or by raising
constitutional issues in criminal cases via the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.313 Or,
they may complain of adverse case outcomes due to lower state and federal courts’
erroneous factual conclusions, which the court disfavors. 314
The Court’s Rule 10 further clarifies the categories of cases which it hears.315
These well-known categories are cases in which there is a split between circuit
courts’ decisions, where a state supreme court’s decision is contrary to federal
precedent, or where a federal circuit court of appeals has “so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.”316
Noteworthy is the limitation on the “departure” provision to circuit courts,
omitting any reference to state courts. The last sentence in Rule 10 goes further to
clarify the Court’s policy disfavoring cases involving matters of “fact,” despite the
312
313

314

315
316

28 U.S.C. § 1254.
These cases originate in district courts, so, in the absence of similar data from the Supreme Court, filing
data from those courts reflect the extent of pro se litigation by prisoners and non-prisoners. See Table C-13:
U.S. District Courts—Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2019, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-13/judicial-business/2019/09/30
(last visited May 19, 2020) (noting about 26% of all civil filings were by PSLs: 17% filed by prisoners and 9%
filed by non-prisoners). As to the types of pro se filings, the AO only collects these for prisoner PSLs. For
2019, their civil case data show that federal and state motions to vacate sentence, habeas, death penalty,
mandamus cases, alien habeas petitions, prison conditions, and prisoner civil rights cases comprise about
19% of the total civil filings. See Table C-2, U.S. District Courts––Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit
and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2019, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2019/12/31 (last visited May
19, 2020). For the period 1998 to 2017, PSLs brought 32 percent of all civil rights cases, and 19 percent of
all employment discrimination cases. Mitchell Levy, Comment, Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in
Federal District Courts, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1841 tbl.2D (2018); see also ELLEN BERRY, ROBERT L.
NELSON & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES
INEQUALITY 58 (2017) (noting that the sample of 1,788 “employment civil rights” cases during 1988 to 2003
drawn for study from seven district courts included 23% filed pro se). Researchers have found that the data
showed “a system that dismisses or summarily terminates a significant portion of cases or that offers small
settlements without authoritative determinations of the validity of claims.” Id. at 55.
As to criminal cases:
Appeals by pro se litigants . . . constituted 49 percent of filings . . . [at] 23,728 cases. Forty-five percent
of all filings by pro se litigants were prisoner petitions. Eighty-seven percent of the 12,365 prisoner
petitions received were filed pro se, as were 86 percent of the 4,985 original proceedings and
miscellaneous applications.
U.S. Courts of Appeals – Judicial Business (2019), U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/us-courtsappeals-judicial-business-2019 (last visited May 19, 2020).
See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in
the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 278–83 (2006).
SUP. CT. R. 10.
Id.
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authorization to do so in Article III: “A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”317
One must assume that the Court’s position disfavoring review of decisions
involving “erroneous factual findings or misapplication of a properly stated rules of
law” is because of its heavy caseload and limited time and resources. We have no
data on the extent to which PSLs (or, for that matter, represented litigants) bring
certiorari petitions involving this form of appeal. It is unlikely that a PSL will be
able to conduct the necessary research to establish that the issue presented is one
involving a split in circuit court decisions. Nor is it likely that a PSL can establish
that his or her case involves a conflict between a state supreme court decision and a
Supreme Court precedent; making this determination would require access to—and
the skill to utilize—computer-aided legal research.318 Even if computers and
computer-based legal research software is available in a prison, many older convicts
without technological skills may prefer law books in print, despite the limitations of
this “old school” research method.319 This, coupled with the Court’s policy
disfavoring appeals based on erroneous factual findings, means the likelihood of a
PSL being able to persuade the Court to grant certiorari in this category of case is
slim to none.
Therefore, one (albeit radical) proposal for reducing the number of suits
against the Court and filings by vexatious litigants is to amend the Court’s Rule 10
to make it more consistent with the Article III grant of “appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact.” In other words, eliminate the policy disfavoring cases raising
factual-dispute claims, which could be subsumed under a new “miscarriage of
justice” category. As noted above, the “departure” provision, now applicable only to
federal circuit courts, should be expanded in Rule 10 to include state court
decisions, from which undoubtedly most PSL petitions arise. This expansion of
317
318

319

Id.
For a survey of states’ movement from print to electronic databases, see Camilla Tubbs, Electronic Research
in State Prisons, 25 LEGAL REF. SERVS. Q., no. 1, 2006, at 13. According to the Prison Insight Blog,
“Computers are also available in the library, especially in the law library because LexisNexis is just about
the only way inmates can do research for their appeals. However, the quality and number of computers
varies by location, and the computer resources available to inmates can be extremely outdated.” Natalie
[surname withheld], Can You Use Computers in Prison?, PRISON INSIGHT, https://prisoninsight.com/can-youuse-computers-in-prison/ (last visited May 15, 2020).
See Russell Smith, Old-School Prisoner Wants Books, Not Westlaw, N.Y.L. SCH.: LEGAL AS SHE IS SPOKE
(Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.lasisblog.com/2011/09/20/old-school-inmate-sues-prison-for-providing-himwith-westlaw/. Reporting on the filing of a prisoner’s denial of access to courts claim:
[H]e is “computer-illiterate” and that even if he could use the computers, seven computers for 2,500
inmates are inadequate for him to conduct his needed research. These gripes do not seem patently
unreasonable. Mr. Harris is probably uncomfortable using computers—he has been incarcerated
since 1989 and has had likely had little or no experience with them. And if his estimates are accurate,
he only has access to a computer once every 30 days, making adjusting to electronic research
potentially impossible for the 47-year-old. While prison officials say that the computers are
“supervised at all times,” Mr. Harris may prefer to research his legal claims (possibly about violations
by prison staff) more discreetly. From Mr. Harris’s perspective, the prison library may indeed be
inadequate.
Id.
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jurisdiction (in so far as expansion of the jurisdictional language of Rule 10) will
surely increase the number of petitions to be screened for merit. It should also
reduce the number of frivolous and vexatious claims post-certiorari denial, as well
as suits against the Court. The added burden to the Court is outweighed by the
justice served thereby.
Adding pro se law clerks to the Court staff as proposed above will also aid the
Court in addressing the potentially increased burden to review fact-based appeals.
As noted earlier, there are thousands of indigent certiorari petitioners, but we have
no data on the number of those petitions that raise disfavored fact-based claims.
These data are necessary in order to determine the extent to which the Supreme
Court would, in fact, be overly burdened by accepting a modest number of such
claims for review. Allowing PSLs to bring such appeals would give them some hope
that they will have a fighting chance that justice will prevail in their case at the
Supreme Court.320
CONCLUSION
This historical examination of pro se litigation in the Supreme Court shows
that PSLs do not all fall into the categories of “pests” or “kooks,” as some judges
believe.321 Most are well-intentioned litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners, who are
unable to afford counsel but seek justice to vindicate a claim, raise a defense, or
challenge a perceived conviction. In reviewing the cases for this Article, however, it
is apparent that today some PSLs, such as those who file suits against the Supreme
Court, its Justices, or its Clerk of Court, can be fairly described as falling into one or
the other of the aforementioned categories based on the nature of their claims and
their named defendants.
However, a closer examination of the nature of the cases reflects the fact that
many involve requests to overturn decisions of other courts below. These PSLs
understandably sought justice from the Supreme Court as the “court of last resort,”
where they perceived it was denied by other lower courts. Due to their lack of
counsel, their unfamiliarity with the legal process and applicable rules, and their
strong feeling that justice was not served in their case, they sometimes decide out of
sheer frustration to take further legal action, this time against the Supreme Court,
complaining of the Court’s denial of their certiorari petitions. It is unfortunate that
these types of claims are made, the merits of which courts must take time to
determine.
Federal courts at all levels must, however, address these unorthodox claims
because PSLs have a statutory right to represent themselves in those courts.322
320

321

322

Another option is for Congress to revisit previous proposals to create another level of appellate court
between the circuit courts and the Supreme Court to address factually based claims.
JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, BARRY MAHONEY, HARVEY SOLOMON & JOAN GREEN, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 60 (1998) (noting some surveyed
judges used such characterizations to refer to PSLs who pursue a political agenda).
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein.”).
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They can do so not only by dismissing the claims, but by having a court staffer (staff
attorney, pro se law clerk, or a pro se ombudsman) directly contact PSLs to explain
why their cases are being dismissed, and, where appropriate, provide them with
information about alternatives they may have available to them. As one judge
noted, “One of the basic principles, one of the glories, of the American system of
justice is that the courthouse door is open to everyone—the humblest citizen, the
indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien.”323 While it seems burdensome for
courts to have to entertain the types of claims described above, they are required to
take the time to cull out the meritorious from the frivolous cases (or those that
merely do not state a cause of action) that are presented to them in order to ensure
access to justice for all litigants. The Supreme Court is no less obligated to both
screen cases for frivolousness and to amend its Rule 10 to make it consistent with
Article III by eliminating the policy disfavoring factually based appeals to ensure
miscarriage-of-justice cases are reviewed.
The Court must not only patiently review these claims but should
communicate with PSLs through pro se law clerks, recognizing that some of these
litigants are extremely frustrated and angry at the lack of justice they perceive was
done in their case. If we believe in equal justice, the Court must not only decide
cases, it must return to its previously compassionate view of PSLs324 and explain to
those who do not understand the rules, customs, and potential consequences of the
legal process. That is the cost of having a legal system in which every person has
the right to seek justice from the court of last resort.

323
324

NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 206 (D.D.C. 1985).
See, e.g., Purcell v. Miner, 71 U.S. 513 (1866).
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APPENDIX
Example of Pleading in Case Against the Supreme Court and other Defendants
Dismissed for Having Unintelligible Pleadings
I
Rice v. U.S. Supreme Court325
Rice v. The United States Supreme Court, The Federal Courthouse,
Sacramento, CA, S JEWS all over the world, John Stroughair, his wife
& Yedwega their daughter in Germany, Oliver Wyman NYNY, and “The
United States Senate.
Systematic Murder of My family
For breaking up AT & T
Aiding & Abetting in Criminal Activity
Stalking my Family & Friends via Computer & Telephone
Denying Equal Rights Under the Law & Justice
Bias Treatment towards Women & Children [and]
Trying to rewrite history
I offer into evidence the following
(1) Ford Motor Company driving their truck through the Constitution
via “Brave New World” Creating a religion for profit
(2) The Ford Modeling Agency & Clayton Ford, Clay Ferrell, and all
other Clays for being profitable and using these profits to continue
driving a hole in the Constitution
(3) I offer also into evidence the relationship between Benjamin &
Madeline Gilbert, their house called Greensleeves, the Song
Greensleeves “Ho Zana” - Oh Susanna and all the other Gilbert family
members . . . for misuse of the judicial system, aiding and abetting in
criminal activities, buying judges, and manipulating judges,
(4) S Jews for saying they are above the law . . .

325

No. C03–05582CRB, 2003 WL 22999539 *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2003).

